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THE "TERMINATED" FIVE TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA:
THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TREATMENT ON THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE SEMINOLE NATION*
Susan Work**
L The Source of Confusion
The so-called "Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma," the Seminole,
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Creek Nations (hereinafter
called the Five Tribes), are among the most misunderstood tribes
in circles of federal Indian law expertise.' The designation of these
tribes as "civilized" reflects the historic attitude of the dominant
culture toward these tribes and is a clue to the unique treatment
these tribes have received at the hands of the federal government.
The Five Tribes are often described as having been the first to
adopt the white man's "ways." It is commonly believed by the
general public that the tribal entities have been terminated, that
tribal members have rapidly assimilated, and that, having merged
into the general population, they no longer have any of the pro-
blems faced by other Indians.2
*This article was prepared for the Oklahoma Indian Legal Research Project of the Native
American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., under the direction of Vincent Knight,
J.D., 1971, New Mexico; member, Ponca Tribe.
* *B.A., 1973, Oklahoma; J.D., 1976, Oklahoma; member, Choctaw Tribe.
1. One of the most recent examples of this misunderstanding is contained in Wilkinson &
Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 144 (1977),
[hereinafter cited as Wilkinson & Biggs], which states: "The closest historical precedent for
outright termination involves the Five Civilized Tribes, the Cherokee, Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole. After their removal to Oklahoma from ancestral lands in
the Southeast, those tribes were subjected to a series of acts and agreements from 1893 to
1906. Taken together, those acts stripped the Five Civilized Tribes of most, but not all,
governmental functions... The status of those and other Oklahoma tribes has since been
altered, and in some instances improved, by a complex set of statutes pertaining to
Oklahoma. As a result, the Five Civilized Tribes are now federally recognized tribes, but
most of their tribal land is gone and it is doubtful that the other effects of those termination
acts will ever be wholly eliminated." [Footnotes omitted.] This statement contains three er-
roneous assumptions: (1) that the Five Tribes were completely terminated, (2) that for some
period of time they were not federally recognized tribes, and (3) that the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act, which is cited as authority in note 5, somehow restored federal recognition
and some degree of government. These are all points that will be addressed in this article.
2. Id. See also M. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 349 (1938):
"Upon the admission of Oklahoma to the Union, the Cherokee Nation furnished leaders
whose ability made them formidable opponents or effective advocates in both state and na-
tional affairs. The passing of an Indian state was but another step in the direction of a larger
Union of American commonwealth"; E. McREYNOLDS, THE SEMINOLES 354 (1959) 1
hereinafter cited as MCREYNOLDS]: "The history of the Seminoles rapidly merged with that
of other citizens of the United States who lived in the same area." See also G. WOODWARD,
THE CHEROKEE S (1963); Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2
AM. IND. L. REV. 38 (No. 2 1974).
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While it is true that for three-quarters of a century the people of
the Five Tribes have had very little control over tribal affairs,
neither the tribal entities nor the tribal governments were ter-
minated by Congress. Tribal members did not all blend into the
melting pot of American society, and today many are confronted
with the same problems of poverty, discrimination, and organiza-
tion of a political structure as are other Indians throughout the
United States.'
The complexity of the legislation dealing with the allotment of
the lands of the Five Tribes and the merger of Oklahoma and In-
dian territories into the state of Oklahoma has been the main
source of confusion concerning the legal status of the Five Tribes.
Immediately after statehood, federal administrative officials
began to rely on these laws to avoid federal recognition of the
tribal governments. Because federal officials refused to recognize
the authority of the elected chief and tribal council, it was difficult
for the people as a group to manage tribal affairs or to exert any
significant political influence on Congress to improve their situa-
tion. But with more legal resources available today, members of
the tribes are beginning to unravel the mysteries surrounding the
allotment legislation. In 1976, Harjo v. Kleppe,' a case brought by
Creek citizens against the Department of Interior, cast a new light
on the misconceptions concerning the governments of the Five
Tribes. That decision contains a fairly exhaustive analysis of the
Five Tribes' allotment legislation. Basically, it holds that the Creek
Nation still possesses the powers necessary for self-government,
and that the 1867 Creek constitution is still a viable legal docu-
ment."
That these tribes have managed to survive for so long under
such adverse circumstances is not really surprising in light of the
strength they exhibited in their earlier dealings with the United
States. Although the Five Tribes did not resort to a long-term
military resistance to federal expansion, they were stronger adver-
saries than many of the western tribes in the political and legal
sense because of their grasp of the federal legislative process,
3. See S. REP. No. 1594, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968): "Despite the long process of ac-
culturation, the Seminole people are generally socially, economically, and educationally
below state and county averages. The development of their abilities to manage community,
tribal, and family affairs has been hampered by the low educational level, language barrier,
assimilation retardation, and lack of employment opportunities. Because of this they tend
to isolate themselves from the general community." Id. at 5. "The average median educa-
tional level achieved by the Seminole adults is fourth grade. Over 50 percent have a limited
use of English." Id. at 8.
4. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976).
5. Id. at 1143.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/3
resulting in treaty provisions expressly guaranteeing them exten-
sive sovereign powers. By the late 1880's the United States govern-
ment had managed to subdue the last of the Plains tribes and had
begun to allot their lands in accordance with the Dawes Act of
1887.6 However, the United States still had to deal with the Five
Tribes before they could eliminate the uncomfortable situation of
having five nations, possessing almost absolute powers of self-
government over their citizens and successfully functioning apart
from the federal system, located in the middle of the federal
republic."
Rather than overtly breaking its treaty promises with the Five
Tribes with one sweeping piece of legislation, Congress took a
step-by-step approach which spanned more than a decade, under
the pretext of securing tribal consent.' By the time this procedure
was completed, Congress had enacted a dozen statutes applicable
to the Five Tribes and Indian Territory in general, plus other
statutes and agreements dealing with each tribe specifically, and
culminating in the allotment of the lands of the Five Tribes and
statehood.' Obviously, it is outside the scope of this article to give
a detailed account of all the allotment legislation affecting the Five
Tribes and the voluminous laws attempting to correct the many
problems which followed.'" However, those provisions, affecting
the question of termination of tribal government and the ability of
the tribes to operate as a governmental entity will be discussed in
some detail.
6. 24 Stat. 388 (1887), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 etseq. SeeD. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT
AND ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LAND (1973), for an analysis of the forces behind the passage of
the Dawes Act. The exclusion of the Five Tribes from the Dawes Act was the result of the
resistance of the Five Tribes to allotment. Id.
7. 24 CONG. REC. 102 (1892) (remarks of Mr. Platt): [Tihe real question which should in-
terest the American people is the question of whether we can longer endure five separate in-
dependent, sovereign, and almost wholly foreign governments within the boundaries of the
United States."
8. Congress created the Five Tribes Commission in 27 Stat. 612 (1893), directing it to
negotiate allotment agreements with the Five Tribes. The allotment of the lands of the Five
Tribes was nearing completion when the Oklahoma Enabling Act, 34 Stat. 267 (1906), was
enacted.
9. The more important statutes include the following: 25 Stat. 783 (1889); 26 Stat. 81
(1890); 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1893); 28 Stat. 693 (1895); 29 Stat. 321, 339 (1896); 30 Stat. 62, 83
(1897); 30 Stat. 495 (1898); 31 Stat. 657 (1900), as amended by32 Stat. 774 (1903); 31 Stat.
794 (1901); 32 Stat. 774 (1903); 31 Stat. 794 (1901); 32 Stat. 841 (1903), amended by 80
Stat. 639 (1966); 33 Stat. 573 (1904,; 34 Stat. 137 (1906); 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
10. The more important of the post-statehood legislation designed to correct the many
problems confronting the people of the Five Tribes include the following: 35 Stat. 312
(1908); 37 Stat. 497 (1912); 38 Stat. 310 (1914), as amended by4l Stat. 1204 (1921); 40 Stat.
606 (1918), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 555, (1970); 42 Stat. 994 (1922); 44 Stat. 239 (1926); 45
Stat. 495 (1928); 69 Stat. 666 (1955); 47 Stat. 777 (1933); 49 Stat. 1967 (1936), codifiedat25
U.S.C. §§ 501 etseq. (1970); 61 Stat. 731 (1947); 66 Stat. 323 (1952); 67 Stat. 558 (1953); 25
U.S.C. § 375d (1970); 84 Stat. 1091 (1970).
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Practically speaking, all of the legislation significant to this
analysis applies to the Five Tribes as a whole, yet each tribe had its
own treaties and allotment agreements, and its own unique
history. Thus, although the present analysis is generally ap-
plicable to each of the tribes, the Seminole Nation will be used as a
model.
A historical background will be outlined with an enumeration
of treaty guarantees of the tribe's sovereign power of self-
government, a description of the form of government, and a sum-
mary of federal legislative and administrative action affecting
tribal government. Then a brief analysis of the concept of tribal
termination, i.e., the cessation of the special federal-Indian rela-
tionship, and its inapplicability to the Seminole Nation, will be
presented. Finally, the inapplicability of the concept of
governmental termination to the Seminole Nation will be exam-
ined at some length. This will be an analysis of those statutes deal-
ing expressly with tribal existence, and an overview of the various
statutory provisions which affected the ability of the tribe to exer-
cise its right to self-government. No attempt will be made to define
the extent of sovereignty left in the tribe, but the foundation for
such an analysis will be provided.
II. Seminole Government Prior To Allotment
Sovereign Status of Government
Like other tribes, the Seminole Nation possessed the inherent
sovereign power of self-government prior to the making of any
treaties with the United States government." However, the federal
government tried to avoid recognition of the sovereign status of
the Seminole Nation in its early relationship with the tribe. The
removal treaties of the 1830's, which directed the removal of the
Seminoles from Florida to Indian Territory, expressed the inten-
tion that the Seminoles should merge into the Creek Nation." The
Seminoles strongly objected to the proposed consolidation of the
11. It is well recognized that tribes are qualified to exercise powers of self-government,
not by virtue of any delegation of power from the federal government, but rather by reason
of their inherent tribal sovereignty, F. COHEN. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942) [hereinafter
cited a. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. See In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115, 116 (1891); United
States v. Kagama, 188 U.S. 375 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12. The Treaty of May 9, 1832, 7 Stat. 368, art. I, provided that the Seminoles would be
removed to the country assigned to the Creeks to be "received as a constituent part of the
Creek Nation and to be readmitted to all the privileges as members of the same." A similar
provision was contained in the Treaty of Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 417, art. IV.
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two tribes, and large numbers refused to migrate westward.'" As a
result, another removal treaty was ratified in 1845," and attempt-
ed to induce more Seminoles to emigrate to Indian Territory by
allowing them to settle apart from the Creeks and to make their
own town regulations subject to the general control of the Creek
council. In spite of this treaty, a large group of Seminoles remained
in Florida, and the Seminoles of Indian Territory continued to ob-
ject to any consolidation with the Creeks."s
Finally, in 1856 a tripartite treaty was made in Washington in
which the ties between the Creeks and Seminoles in Indian Ter-
ritory were severed.1 6 The treaty provided for the cession of a tract
of Creek land to the Seminoles'7 and guaranteed both tribes the
right to self-government as follows:
So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the
United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof
regulating trade and intercourse with their Indian tribes, the
Creeks and Seminoles shall be secured in the unrestricted
right of self-government within their respected limits; except-
ing, however, all white persons with their property, who are
not, by adoption or otherwise, members of either the Creek
or Seminole tribe; and all persons not being members of
either tribe, found within their limits, shall be considered in-
truders, and be removed from and kept out of the same by
the United States agents for said tribes, respectively;
(assisted, if necessary, by the military;).... "
13. The objection of the Seminoles to consolidation is reflected in the Treaty of Jan. 4,
1845, 9 Stat. 821:"Many of the Seminoles have settled and are now living in the Creek
Country, while others, constituting a large portion of the tribe, have refused to make their
homes in any part thereof, assigning as a reason that they are unwilling to submit to the
Creek laws and government, and that they are apprehensive of being deprived, by the
Creek authorities of their property ......
14. Id., art. l.
15. Seminole leaders in Indian Territory complained in an 1855 resolution that the
Seminoles were a separate people from the Creeks, and that the United States was acting in
an unjust and arbitrary manner by attempting to join them with the Creeks. They stated
that harmony and friendship between the two tribes could not be accomplished while they
were joined in an artificial and undesired union. McREYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 275.
16. Treaty of Aug. 7, 1856, 11 Stat. 699.
17. Id., art. I.
18. Id., art. XV. This article was cited along with other treaty provisions in a discussion
of tribal powers in Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 951 (1905), app. dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906), in which the Court stated: "This power to govern the people within its territory was
repeatedly guaranteed to the Creek Tribes by the United States ... founded in its original
national sovereignty, and secured by these treaties, the governmental authority of the
Creek Nation, subject always to the superior power of the republic, remained practically
unimpaired until the year 1889."
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The treaty further protected tribal autonomy by providing:
The United States do hereby solemnly agree and bind
themselves, that no state or territory shall ever pass laws for
the government of the Creek or Seminole Tribes of Indians
and that no portion either of the tracts or country defined in
the first and second articles of this agreement shall ever be
erected into a territory without the full and free consent of
the legislative authority of the tribe owning the same. '9
After the Civil War, the Five Tribes were forced to make new
treaties because many of their citizens had fought with the Con-
federacy."0 It is important to note, however, that the Seminole
Treaty of 1866 specifically reaffirmed previous treaty obligations
not inconsistent with the new treaty.2' In fact, the only provision
in the 1866 treaty involving tribal government was one which ex-
pressly recognized Seminole governmental authority:
The Seminole Nation agrees to such legislation as Congress
and the President may deem necessary for the better ad-
ministration of the rights of person or property within Indian
Territory: Provided, however, [That] said legislation shall
not in any manner interfere with or annul their present tribal
organization, rights, laws, privileges, and customs."2
This treaty provision indicates that the United States recognized
that it did not possess plenary power over the Seminole Nation
because tribal consent to federal legislation generally affecting the
tribe was apparently deemed necessary, and because the United
States agreed not to interfere with tribal government in any way.
The 1.866 treaty also created a general council of the Five Tribes in
Indian Territory which would legislate on the intercourse and rela-
19. Id., art. IV. The United States Supreme Court in Atlantic & Pac. R.R. v. Mingus,
165 U.S. 413 (1897), cited similar guaranties of self-government contained in the Cherokee
Treaty of Dec. 19, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, art. V; Cherokee Treaty of Aug. 16, 1846, 9 Stat. 871,
art. I; Choctaw Treaty of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, art. II; Creek Treaty of Mar. 24, 1832,
7 Stat. 344, and made the following statement concerning the governments of those tribes:
"under the guarantees of these and other similar treaties the Indians have proceeded to
establi,;h and carry on independent governments of their own, enacting and executing their
own laws, punishing their own criminals, appointing their own officers, raising and expen-
ding their own revenues ....
20. Cherokee Treaty of July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799; Choctaw & Chickasaw Treaty of
Apr. 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 769; Creek Treaty of June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785; Seminole Treaty of
Mar. 21, 1866, 14 Stat. 755.
21. Treaty of Mar. 21, 1866, 14 Stat. 755, art. IX. In Seminole Nation v. United States,
171 Ct. Cl. 477 (1965), it was held that the 1866 treaty was valid, that there was no coer-
cion in its signing, and that the United States was fair and honorable in the treaty process.
22. Id., art. VII.
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tionships between the tribes, but protected each tribe's right to
govern itself with the provision: "nor shall said council legislate
upon matters pertaining to the organization, laws or customs of
the several tribes except as herein provided for."'
The 1866 treaty was the last Seminole Treaty," but the 1898
Seminole allotment agreement, which carried the same weight as a
treaty,' provided: "This agreement shall in no wise affect the pro-
vision of existing treaties between the Seminole Nation and the
United States except in so far as it is inconsistent therewith."26 The
only provision of the agreement expressly inconsistent with the
1856 and 1866 treaty provisions affecting tribal self-government
conferred jurisdiction to the United States courts over certain
crimes and legal actions committed within the borders of the
Seminole Nation."' In spite of this treaty protection, federal legisla-
tion and unauthorized state action violated the tribe's right to self-
government, resulting in the present confusion concerning the ter-
mination issue.
Form of Government
Immediately after their removal to Indian Territory, the United
States recognized only a limited right of self-government in the
Seminole people because the 1832 and 1845 treaties subjected them
to the authority of the Creek Council. Despite this, the Seminoles
established their own government in Indian Territory. There were
twenty-five towns, or bands, constituting the Seminole Tribe.
Each town elected a tustenugee, (subchief) and the Seminole
Council was composed of these subchiefs under the presidency of
23. Id., art. VII(3).
24. The Seminole government expressly recognized the validity of its treaties in its writ-
ten laws as follows: "The lands set apart by the treaty with the United States in the year
1856, and reaffirmed in the treaty of 1866, as the Seminole reservation, and lying west of
the Western boundary line of the Muskogee Nation, and between the north and south
Canadian rivers we declare to be the country of the Seminoles, and by this fact we are guid-
ed in all public acts .... Within our boundary lines alone will we exercise authority and
operate our laws for the government of ourselves .... In the government of ourselves by
these laws, it is hereby declared and understood that attention and cognizance will be taken
only of such interest and questions of a public character as have arisen since and subsequent
to the ratification of the treaty with the United States in the year 1856 .... " Revised
Statutes of the Seminole Nation (1903), ch. 1, art. I, Oklahoma Historical Society, Indian
Archives, Seminole Documents, Volume S, which is a translation by G.W. Grayson, dated
July 11, 1909, of the original manuscript loaned to the Indian Inspector, J. George Wright,
by Chief John R. Brown [hereinafter cited as 1903 Revised Statutes of the Seminole Nation].
The original Seminole document is contained in the Seminole Documents, Volume 12.
25. Note, Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. § 71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a Self-
Limitation of ContractualAbiity75 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 239 (1977).
26. 30 Stat. 567(1898).
27. Id.
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the principal chief, or king. Supervision over the towns, by
Seminole custom, belonged to the Council.' After the 1856 treaty
severed the ties between the Seminole and Creek nations, reaffirm-
ing the Seminole Nation's right of self-government, the Seminoles
moved to their new national domain. By 1860 a council house had
been constructed and laws had been enacted which determined the
governmental organization.0 This organization remained basical-
ly unchanged even by a codification of the more important
Seminole laws in the form of the 1903 Revised Statutes of the
Seminole Nation." There was no written tribal constitution, but
the laws functioned as a constitution.2
According to the 1903 Revised Statutes, the tribal government
was comprised of two branches consisting of the General Council
and a principal and second chief. The General Council was
basically responsible for all decisions concerning tribal affairs. It
exercised legislative powers in accordance with the Revised
Statutes, which provided: "We will be governed only by such laws
as have been regularly enacted by the National Council of the
Seminole Nation."3' The Council also was responsible for judicial
decisions in criminal and civil cases, thus serving in a judicial
capacity as well as a legislative capacity.3
The principal and second chiefs had the broad executive power
to "carry on the government in strict accordance of the law," and
to recommend to the National Council those measures in the best
interest of the nation."4 The statutes expressly granted them the
pardoning power;" a limited veto power, which could be over-
ridden if no legal objections were given and the Council reaffirmed
its action; authority to issue arrest warrants; 7 to use tribal funds
28. McREYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 260.
29. id. at 277-78.
30. 1903 Revised Statutes of the Seniinole Nation, supra note 24.
31. d. The main chapters outlining the structure of the tribal government include
chapters 1-6, 21, 25, 32, 49, and 67.
32. d., ch. 2. The Seminole laws cover criminal areas such as wrongful lies (ch. 8), theft
(ch. 9), arms violations (ch. 13), breaking and entering (ch. 14), and rape (ch. 12). It covers
civil areas such as marriage (ch. 20), sales (ch. 27), hiring property (ch. 28), establishment
of business by noncitizens (ch. 32), taxation (ch. 340), public roads (ch. 40), estates and
wills (chs. 44, 45, 46, and 51), and divorce (ch. 47). supra note 24.
33. d., ch. 21, which provides: "Sec. III. Any person with a grievance shall report his
case to the chiefs of the Nation, and if after preliminary examination they shall deem it wor-
thy of a judicial trial by the Council, the same shall be laid before that body for considera-
tion .... Sec. VI. All cases of whatsoever character shall be laid before the National Coun-
cil for consideration and settlement by the Chiefs in accordance with the provisions of this
act."
34. Id.,ch. 39, §§ 1, 2,3.
35. Id., ch. 49.
36. Id., ch. 39, §§ 4, 5.
37. Id., ch. 6.
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for law enforcement; 8 and to present cases to the Council for
judicial decision. 9 The chiefs also had the power to disapprove
Council judicial decisions, thus serving the judicial branch as an
appellate court."0
The Council and chiefs were the two most important govern-
mental branches, yet the foundation of tribal government was the
tribal town. There were fourteen tribal towns, each with an
elected town chief." Each town had a delegate in nominating con-
ventions for the principal and second chief'2 and each town chief
served on the National Council, along with two elected represen-
tatives from each town.'3 The importance of the town chiefs is
reflected in the Revised Statutes as follows: "It is hereby
acknowledged and declared that the town Chiefs are of in-
estimable value and benefit to the Nation being as they are in close
touch with the people."" Besides their powers as Council
members, town chiefs had the authority to enact rules and regula-
tions and assess fines for the regulation of immediate local
affairs. 5
The provisions of the 1903 Revised Statutes appear to be the
most recently written laws of the Seminole Nation defining
Seminole government until adoption of the 1969 constitution,
which will be discussed later.
The preceding brief history of Seminole government at the time
of statehood demonstrates clearly the tribe's ability to govern
itself. However, the legal status of the Seminole government
became a source of confusion when complex federal legislation
and the subsequent federal administrative treatment of tribal
government impaired the exercise of this legal right by tribal
members.
III. Overview of Federal Legislative andAdministrative
Action Affecting Tribal Government
Federal Statutes Prior to Statehood
The sovereign status of the Seminole Nation remained relatively
untouched by Congress until the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
38. Id., ch. 25.
39. Id., ch. 21.
40. Id., ch. 67.
41. Id., chs. 2, 4.
42. Id., ch. 3.
43. Id. ,chs. 2, 4.
44. Id.. ch. 25, §4.
45. Id.
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tury. 6 However, congressional interference began with the
passage of the Act of March 3, 1871, which prohibited treaty-
making with Indian tribes. 7 A few years later Congress began to
pass special statutes authorizing railroad construction in Indian
Territory. 8 Strong objections were heard from the Five Tribes, but
the validity of the statutes was upheld by the Supreme Court
under the federal power of eminent domain.'" The establishment of
railroads strengthened the pressure for allotment, and in 1887 the
Dawes Act, providing for the allotment of Indian lands, was
enacted.' The Dawes Act excluded the Five Tribes from its ap-
plication, but legislation affecting those tribes soon followed. "' On
March 1, 1889, an act was passed which established federal courts
in Indian Territory. 2 The act conferred on these federal courts on-
ly limited civil jurisdiction, and criminal jurisdiction over certain
specified crimes.53 However, it expressly excluded Indian versus
Indian conflicts from federal jurisdiction.'
Pursuant to the Dawes Act, the lands of the Plains tribes, who
occupied the western half of Indian Territory, were allotted. As a
46. Congress did not begin to negotiate with the Five Tribes concerning the allotment of
their lands and the incorporation of Indian Territory into a state until it created the Five
Tribes Commission, 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1893).
47. 16 Stat. 466 (1871), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970). Prior to the 1871 Act the ex-
ecutive branch had the authority to negotiate treaties and the Senate had the power of trea-
ty ratification. The 1871 Act was the result of the opposition of the House to its practical
exclusion from any policy-making role in Indian affairs. As a result of the Act, Congress
began exercising greater authority over tribes, and soon judicial recognition of its complete
plenary powers was established. For a discussion of the legal significance of this act, see
Note, 5 25 U.S.C. 71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a Self-Limitation of Contractual
Ability?, 5AM. INDIAN L. REv. 239 (1977).
48. Statutes authorizing the construction of individual railroads through Indian Ter-
ritory included the following: 23 Stat. 73 (1884); 25 Stat. 47 (1888); 27 Stat. 492 (1893); 29
Stat. 80 (1896); 32 Stat. 43 (1902). Congress also enacted two general statutes authorizing
the construction of railroads. 30 Stat. 990 (1899); 32 Stat. 43 (1902).
49. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1889).
50. 24 Stat. 388 (1887), codified at25 U.S.C. § § 331 etseq. (1970).
51. ld.,§8.
52. 25 Stat. 783 (1889).
53. Id., §§ 5, 6, 20, 22-26. The Act extended jurisdiction over all civil actions involving
$100 or more; all controversies arising out of mining leases or contracts made with one of
the Five Tribes where the amount involved exceeded $100: and over all offenses against the
laws of the United States committed within the Indian Territory "as in this act defined" not
punishable by death or imprisonment at hard labor. The Act defined several types of crimes
subject to federal jurisdiction when committed in Indian Territory, including obstruction of
railroad tracks or telephone or telegraph lines, disturbance of a religious assembly, assault,
and arson. However, the Act specifically made these crimes inapplicable to Indian versus
Indian conflicts. Although the Act extended jurisdiction over Indian-non-Indian controver-
sies within the areas enumerated, proceedings were to be conducted in English only, and
jurors were required to be English-speaking United States citizens. At that time, members of
the Five Tribes were not United States citizens, and English was not the primary language of
the Five Tribes.
54. Id.,§ 27.
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result of increased pressure in that area for a non-Indian govern-
ment, the Organic Act was enacted in 1890.5' The act created
Oklahoma Territory in the western half of Indian Territory and
set up a territorial government there.' The eastern half, occupied
by the Five Tribes, remained Indian Territory. 7 Although the
Organic Act did not impose a territorial government on Indian
Territory, it did provide for more extensive federal jurisdiction
there, and extended a number of Arkansas civil and federal
criminal laws over it."5 However, the act recognized that each of
the Five Tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over conflicts between
tribal members.
In 1893 the Five Tribes Commission was created to negotiate
with the tribes for the extinguishment of tribal title in order to ef-
fect the ultimate creation of a state embracing Oklahoma and In-
dian Territories.' In 1895 a lengthy act dealing with federal
55. 26 Stat. 81 (1890).
56. Id. Section I of the Act established the boundaries between the two territories. Sec-
tions 2-28 dealt with governmental and jurisdictional matters in the newly established
Oklahoma Territory.
57. Id. Sections 29-44 dealt with affairs within the new boundaries of Indian Territory.
58. Id. Section 29 of the Act gave federal courts jurisdiction over all civil cases, "except
cases over which the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction," with a provision that tribal laws
would be applied in the enforcement of contracts between Indians and United States
citizens. Section 34 of the Act contained an extensive grant of criminal jurisdiction to the
federal courts. Section 33 put Arkansas criminal laws and laws of criminal procedure into
effect, and two chapters of the federal statutes concerning traffic in intoxicating liquor. Sec-
tion 35 put into effect a chapter of the United States Revised Statutes dealing with crimes
committed in judicial proceedings in Indian Territory impeding the enforcement of laws in
those courts, and Section 37 added the promotion of lotteries to the lengthy list of crimes
subject to federal jurisdiction in Indian Territory. Section 31 of the Act (amended29 Stat.
510 (1897)) extended the United States Constitution and all general criminal laws of the
United States prohibiting crimes in places subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction over In-
dian Territory. That section also extended Arkansas laws of administration, probate, civil
rights, descent and distribution, divorce, dower, participation and sale of lands, wills, and
marriage. However, Congress was careful to protect the validity of marriages contracted
under tribal laws and customs in Section 38 of the Act.
59. Id., §§ 30, 31. Section 31 of the Act (amended29 Stat. 510 (1897)) also protected
tribal lands by prohibiting attachments against improvements on tribal lands, with a few
exceptions, and by invalidating any judgments other than those of tribal courts ordering
sales of improvements on tribal lands, with a few exceptions. The section further provided
that any improvements of a non-Indian judgment debtor could be sold only to citizens of
the tribe possible failure to ratify pending agreements, Mr. Curtis... addressed himself to
the preparation of the bill the general design of which would be to transfer the property
rights in these nations from tribal authority to that of the United States." Id., Vo!.10, at 7
(1903): "Under these conditions Congress was in 1898 fairly confronted with the alternative
of either abandoning its policy and abolishing the Commission, or else of converting the
Commission from merely a negotiating body into also an executive and semi-judicial body,
and of proceeding with the work under the constitutional power of Congress, and largely,
at least, regardless of the will of the tribe."
60. 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1893). The Commission was directed by Congress in 29 Stat. 321,
339 (1896), to "respect all laws of the several Nations or tribes, not inconsistent with the
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judicial authority in Indian Territory was enacted." Its more im-
portant provisions created an appellate court and prisons 2 and ex-
tended Arkansas criminal laws over Indian Territory. 3 The 1895
act did not affect the exclusive tribal jurisdiction over tribal
members,' but the Act of June 7, 1897, gave the United States
courts exclusive jurisdiction to try all civil and criminal cases, and
extended Arkansas and federal laws over everyone "irrespective of
race." The 1897 act also contained a provision requiring
presidential approval of all acts, ordinances, or resolutions of each
of the Five Tribes.' However, both of these provisions were
superseded by the 1898 Seminole Agreement," as a later analysis
will show.
During the latter part of 1897 the Five Tribes Commission
negotiated with the member tribes for allotment, but the Seminole
Nation was the only tribe to ratify its agreement." When it became
apparent that the other tribes would not cooperate, Congress
enacted the Act of June 28, 1898, known as the Curtis Act, in
order to force them to consent to allotment.' This Act had the
potential to weaken tribal government considerably. Besides pro-
viding for the compulsory allotment of tribal lands," the Act
laws of the United States, and all treaties with either of said Nations or tribes," and to give
due force and effect to the rolls, usages, and customs of each of said Nations or tribes.
61. 28 Stat. 693 (1895).
62. Id., §§ 10, 11.
63. Id. § 4.
64. Id. Section 9 of the Act merely reaffirmed the jurisdiction already possessed by
United States courts in Indian Territory, repealing those acts conferring criminal jurisdic-
tion on federal courts located outside of Indian Territory.
65. 30 Stat. 62, 83 (1897), repealedas to Seminoles, 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
66. id.
67. 30 Stat. 567(1898).
68. 5 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 2 (1898)
[hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
69. Id. at 5: "In the meanwhile, in contemplation of the condition in which the Territory
would be left by the possible failure to ratify pending agreements, Mr. Curtis... addressed
himself to the prepartion of the bill the general design of which would be to transfer the
property rights in these nations from tribal authority to that of the United States." Id., Vol.
10, at 7 (1903): "Under these conditions Congress was in 1898 fairly confronted with the
alternative of either abandoning its policy and abolishing the Commission, or else of con-
verting the Commission from merely a negotiating body into also an executive and semi-
judicial body, and of proceeding with the work under the constitutional power of Con-
gress, and largely, at least, regardless of the will of the tribe."
70. 30 Stat. 495, § 11 (1898). There were numerous provisions dealing with the disposi-
tion of property. Section 4 set up a scheme for payments for improvements made by per-
sons failing to make the citizenship rolls. Section 14 allowed the taxation of personal pro-
perty by city governments and provided for the establishment of free schools by city
governments according to Arkansas laws. Section 15 created town commissions to lay out
town sites and appraise town lots and their improvements; providing for the sale of im-
proved lots, and the condemnation of improvements in federal courts, and allowed the sale
of unimproved town lots of auction. Other sections provided for judicial involvement in
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/3
granted territorial towns the right to establish municipal govern-
ments under Arkansas laws;' it made the civil laws of the tribes
unenforceable in federal courts;7' it abolished tribal courts;5 and it
contained a provision prohibiting payments by the United States
to tribal officers for disbursement to tribal members.'4 However, it
provided an escape hatch for the Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw
tribes: It incorporated the provisions of the tentative agreements
made earlier with each of those tribes, providing that if the agree-
ment was ratified by the tribe, the provisions of the agreement
would replace any conflicting provisions in the Curtis Act.' No
mention was made of the Seminole and Cherokee agreements
because the Seminole Tribe had already ratified its agreement, and
the Cherokee Tribe had refused to negotiate even a tentative
agreement.
During the same period of time the Curtis Act was being
debated, Congress was debating ratification of the Seminole
Agreement." Three days after passage of the Curtis Act, Congress
the disposition of land, Section 3 gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases against those
claiming the right to hold lands by virtue of membership, and allowed tribal members to
bring suits for removal of those in wrongful possession of lands when the chief refused to
do so in behalf of the tribe. Section 11 provided for the ouster of illegal allottees. Sections
16 and 17 made excessive land holdings and demands by individuals for rents and royalties
subject to criminal prosecution. Section 2 required federal courts to make the tribes party to
any suits in any way affecting tribal lands.
71. Id.,§14.
72. Id.,§ 26.
73. Id., § 28. This provision was to be effective as to the Cherokees July 1, 1898, and as
to Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, Oct. 1, 1898.
74. Id., § 19. Other provisions also weakened tribal control over land and funds. Sec-
tion 13 gave the Secretary the authority to make all leases of mineral interests in Indian Ter-
ritory, pursuant to rules and regulations created by him, and Section 23 invalidated all
leases of agricultural or grazing land belonging to any tribe. Section 16 provided that all
money from rented tribal lands and all mineral royalties were to be paid to the United
States Treasury to the credit of the tribe under rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Interior.
75. Id., §§ 29, 31. The Creeks refused to ratify their agreement and the Curtis Act
became effective as to that tribe. But the Creeks consented to a new agreement ratified by
Congress in 31 Stat. 861 (1901). The agreement contained a provision protecting treaty
rights but did not expressly repeal the Curtis Act. The agreement did contain a provision,
however, to the effect that Creek courts were not revived by the agreement, indicating that
the treaty protection provision may have impliedly repealed some provisions of the Curtis
Act. The Choctaws and Chickasaws chose to ratify their tentative agreement on Aug. 24,
1898, 5 ANNUAL RE PORT, supra note 68. Thus, it was incorporated into the Curtis Act and
superseded inconsistent provisons of that Act, as provided by Section 29.
76. The Cherokees later made an agreement ratified in 31 Stat. 848 (1901). The agree-
ment provided that Section 13 of the Curtis Act would not apply to Cherokee lands, and
that"no Act of Congress or treaty provisions inconsistent with this agreement shall be in
force in said nations" except Sections 14, 27, and 28 of the Curtis Act, which authorized the
incorporation of towns, the location of an Indian inspector in Indian Territory, and
abolished tribal courts.
77. 30 Stat. 567(1898).
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ratified the agreement without amendment." Although it provided
for the allotment of Seminole lands and per capita distribution of
funds, it had a minor impact on tribal sovereignty compared to
the Curtis Act. The only express diminution of governmental
powers was a grant of exclusive federal juridiction over all con-
troversies growing out of the title, ownership, occupation, or use
of real estate owned by the Seminoles, and over the crimes of
homicide, embezzlement, bribery, and embracery committed in
the Seminole country, without reference to race or citizenship of
the persons charged." Other provisions expressly recognized tribal
powers by requiring approval by the principal chief of all surface
leases of allotments; giving tribal government the sole authority to
lease mineral rights with the allottee's consent and the right to half
of the mineral royalties; preserving the jurisdiction of tribal
courts; and by repealing the provisions of the Act of June 7, 1897,
which in any manner affected the proceedings of the General
Council.'
Besides these specific provisions concerning tribal government,
the Agreement contained two broad protections of the Seminole
right to self-government. It provided: "This agreement shall in no
wise affect the provisions of existing treaties between the Seminole
Nation and the United States except in so far as it is inconsistent
therewith.""1 The Agreement also repealed "all laws and parts of
laws" inconsistent with its provisions. 2 Considering these provi-
sions in pari materia with those of the Curtis Act, it is obvious
78. The Curtis Act was introduced on Feb. 24, 1898 and passed on June 28, 1898. The
Seminole Agreement was introduced on Feb. 7, 1898, and passed on July 1, 1898. See 31
CONG. REC. 2154, 2346, 3867, 3941, 5086, 5551, 5556, 5582, 5590, 5593, 5766, 6172, 6191,
6357, 6,100, 6806 (1898) and the accompanying H.R. REP. No. 593 for the legislative history
of the Curtis Act. See 31 CSO CONG. REC. 1494, 1535, 1589, 5506, 5575, 5581, 5766,
5646, 5766, 6235, 6271, CSC 6457, 6400, 6568 (1898) and the accompanying H.R. REP. No.
79 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
80. id. It should be noted here that Congress provided in 35 Stat. 312, Sec. 11 (1908),
that the interest of the nation in royalties from allotted lands, which was granted by the
Seminole Agreement, would cease on June 30, 1908.
81. 30 Stat. 567 (1898). The following discussion took place in the House concerning the
provision protecting existing treaty provisions:
"Mr. CANNON: I want to ask my friend a little further. On page 6, what is the effect of
the following words on the top of the page: 'This agreement shall in no wise affect the pro-
vision of existing treaties between the Seminole Nation and the United States, except in so
far as it is inconsistent therewith'?
"Mr. CURTIS of Kansas: Their general council has certain rights under the old treaties. It
may enact certain laws which are to be enforced by the Indian court, and it has a right to
provide for the running of their government, etc.
"Mr. CANNON. All of that is to disappear when you dissolve the tribal relations?
Mr. CURTIS of Kansas: Yes; but until that time they are to have the right of passing
laws, and their courts are to have limited jurisdiction." 31 CONG. REC. 5575 (1898).
82. 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
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that the Curtis Act was not intended to apply to the Seminole Na-
tion, at least insofar as it conflicted with the Seminole
Agreement."
Two years after ratification of the Seminole Agreement, on June
2, 1900, Congress ratified the Supplemental Seminole Agree-
ment. " This agreement defined the final Seminole citizenship rolls,
and provided that the property of Seminole citizens dying after the
year 1899 would descend to heirs "who are Seminole citizens" ac-
cording to the laws of Arkansas, with a minor exception.
After ratification of the Seminole Agreements, Congress con-
tinued to enact various statutes that were laying the foundation
for statehood. The Act of March 3, 1903," was one of the more
significant acts passed during this time. It provided that the
Seminole government would end March 4, 1906, but was later im-
pliedly repealed by a joint resolution of Congress' and by the Five
Tribes Act of 1906." Another significant act was the Act of April
28, 1904, which gave federal courts "full and complete" jurisdic-
tion over the settlement of estates and the guardianship of minors
and incompetents, "whether Indians, freedmen, or otherwise.""'
That act also extended "all the laws of Arkansas heretofore put in
force" in Indian Territory "so as to embrace all persons and estates
in said Territory, whether Indian, freedmen, or otherwise.""
The last statute dealing with tribal government enacted prior to
the enactment of the Oklahoma Enabling Act was the Five Tribes
Act of 1906." In general the Act provided for completion of the
83. According to a Five Tribes Commission report: "The one [agreement] with the
Seminoles has since been ratified and is now the law which will hereafter control in that na-
tion both its government and property holdings." The report was submitted to Congress
after passage of the Curtis Act and ratification of the Seminole Agreement, and contained a
copy of the Curtis Act and a discussion of the unratified agreements of the other tribes. 5
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 4. According to Seminole Nation v. United States, 28
Ind. Cl. Com. 117, 126-27 (1972): "The Curtis Act, in its application concerned the allot-
ment of tribal lands of those of the Five Civilized Tribes which had not come to agreement
with the United States. The Seminoles had reached their agreement and the allotments were
as provided by the specific terms of that agreement ......
84. 31 Stat. 250 (1890). Like the original agreement, the supplemental agreement re-
quired ratification by both Congress and the Seminole Council.
85. 32 Stat. 982 (1903), repealed34 Stat. 822 (1906) and 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
86. 34 Stat. 822 (1906). The resolution continued the tribal governments of the Five
Tribes "in full force and effect for all purposes under existing laws" until all property of the
tribes was distributed "unless hereafter otherwose provided by law." This provision was
later amended, 34 Stat. 137, § 28 (1906).
87. 34 Stat. 137 (1906). Section 28 continued tribal existence and government indefinite-
ly, "until otherwise provided by law."
88. 33 Stat. 573, § 2 (1904).
89. Id.
90. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
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final rolls of citizenship;' it contained a number of provisions
relating to the final disposition of tribal lands; 2 it authorized the
Secretary of Interior to run the tribal schools;"3 and expanded
federal control over lands held by allottees."' The Act also extend-
ed the powers of municipalities to include the authority to im-
prove roads and to tax individual landowners within town
borders."5 It further authorized light and power companies to con-
struct and maintain canals, reservoirs, auxiliary steam works, and
dams across nonnavigable streams and to condemn the necessary
lands, subjecting these rights to future state control."°
This lengthy Act also contained two important provisions more
directly related to tribal government. In order to ensure that the
conveyance of allotments would not be interrupted by the refusal
of any principal chief to sign deeds, Section 6 empowered the
President to fill the office of principal chief in three limited cir-
cumstances: the removal, disability, or death of the incumbent.
This section was misinterpreted for years by federal officials as
prohibiting tribal elections of tribal officers, notwithstanding a sec-
ond section directly related to tribal government, Section 28,
which expressly continued the tribal existence and governments of
the Five Tribes. The only express limitations placed on the govern-
ment by Section 28 was the requirement that all council legislation
and contracts affecting tribal property be approved by the Presi-
dent of the United States and a provision limiting the length of
council sessions to 30 days out of every year.
Other provisions of the 1906 Five Tribes Act governed the
tribe's power to control its financial affairs. Section 11 authorized
the Secretary of Interior to collect all tribal revenues and pay all
lawful claims against the tribe, abolished all taxes accruing under
tribal law, and directed tribal officers to make a full accounting of
all tribal records and documents in their possession and to deliver
all other tribal properties to him. Other sections affecting tribal
financial affairs included Section 17, which provided for the per
91. id.,§ 1.
92. Id., §§ 1, 2 (amended 34 Stat. 342 (19061), 4, 5, 14, 15 (amended 34 Stat. 342
(1906)), 16, 27.
93. Id., § 10.
94. id. Section 20 authorized the Secretary of Interior to approve leases of privately
owned lands, other than homesteads, of fullblood allottees. Section 19 restricted the allot-
ted lands of fullbloods from sale for a period of twenty -five years, but allowed the sale of
inherited lands. Section 23 prohibited the disinheritance of the parent, spouse, or children
of fullbloods without court approval. Section 21 provided that if a person died intestate
without heirs, his allotments would revert to the tribe if death occurred prior to final
distribution, and to the state if death occurred afterward.
95. Id., § 26.
96. Id., 25.
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capita distribution of proceeds from the sale of any unallotted
lands, and Section 24, which authorized the expenditure of tribal
funds for damage to private lands caused by the establishment of
public highways, as well as for the actual cost of building the
highways. An analysis below will indicate that these last three sec-
tions assumed a prior dissolution of tribal government and are
thus inoperative.
The passage of the Five Tribes Act cleared the way to statehood
and on June 16, 1906, Congress enacted a statute enabling the peo-
ple of Oklahoma and Indian Territories to create the state of
Oklahoma. 7 The Enabling Act put the laws of Oklahoma Ter-
ritory in force, "as far as applicable ... until changed by the
legislature thereof,"" and provided that the state courts would be
the successor of all courts of original jurisdiction of the two ter-
ritoriesY The Act protected the rights of Indians and the involve-
ment of the federal government in Indian affairs as follows:
That nothing contained in the said constitution shall be
construed to limit or impair the rights of person or property
pertaining to the Indians of said Territories (so long as such
rights remain unextinguished) or to limit or affect the
authority of the government of the United States to make any
law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, pro-
perty, or other rights by treaties, agreement, law or other-
wise, which it would have been competent to make if this Act
had never been passed.'"
The Act also contained a provision in which the state disclaimed
any rights to unappropriated public lands owned or held by any
Indian or tribe, and provided for federal jurisdiction over those
lands until the title should be extinguished by the United States.''
As required by the Enabling Act, the state constitution pro-
vides:
The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare that
they forever disclaim all right and title in or to any unap-
propriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof,
and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any
Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until the title to any such
public land shall have been extinguished by the United
97. 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
98. Id., § 13.
99. Id., § 19.
100. Id., § 1.
101. Id., § 3.
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States, the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdic-
tion, disposal, and control of the United States. 2
Post-Statehood Federal Legislative andAdministrative
Interference With Tribal Government
The massive federal legislation necessary to accomplish allot-
ment resulted in considerable confusion among both tribal and
federal officials soon after statehood. In 1907 the Seminole Coun-
cil passed an act continuing in office all the old officers, but its
authority to do so was disputed by many Seminole citizens.''
They took the view that because the Five Tribes Act continued the
tribal government, they were still entitled to elect officers to carry
out tribal law. These citizens requested an opinion from the
Secretary of Interior, and a few weeks later the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs recommended to the Secretary that an election be
called for the purpose of electing tribal officers in accordance with
Seminole laws.' The Commissioner relied on an office letter
which expressed the opinion that the 1906 Five Tribes Act did not
merely continue the incumbents in office, but continued the actual
form of Seminole government.'0 ' The Acting Secretary refused to
follow the Commissioner's recommendation, stating:
,Without entering into any discussion as to the possible con-
struction of Section 28 of the Act of April 26, 1906; it is
believed that Congress thereby intended that the existing
status of the Five Civilized Tribes, so far as their officials
were concerned was not to be disturbed during the short re-
maining period of tribal existence. [Emphasis added. '
Consistent with the Department's view, John Brown, who was
the elected principal chief when the Five Tribes Act was enacted,
continued in that capacity until his death in 1919.'"' In the follow-
102. OKLA. CONST., art. I, § 3.
103. Letter from George Jones to F.E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs (July 26,
1907) (National Archives, Natural Resources Division [hereinafter cited N.A., N.R.D.]).
104. Letter from F.E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to the Secretary of Interior
(Aug. 26, 1907) (N.A., N.R.D.).
105. Id. The office letter was dated July 24, 1907, and approved by the Department on
July 25, 1907, but was later recalled by the Department.
106. Letter from G.W. Woodruss, Acting Secretary of Interior, to F.E. Leupp, Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs (Sept. 5, 1907) (N.A., N.R.D.).
107. John Brown was elected by the Council in 1905 after the death of Principal Chief
Hulputta. Micco. Letter from Frank L. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary
of Interior (July 22, 1905) (N.A., N.R.D.).
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ing years the Department continued to refuse to recognize tribal
elections, interpreting Section 6 of the Five Tribes Act as placing
the exclusive authority to select a chief in the President of the
United States.' Because the Five Tribes Act required the chief's
signature on deeds to tribal lands,'" the Department secured the
presidential appointment of a chief for short periods of time on
several occasions, in spite of protests by Seminole citizens."' These
appointments, however, did not always accomplish the results
desired by the BIA. When Alice B. Davis was appointed chief in
1923 for the purpose of signing deeds, she refused to sign the
deeds, viewing the land sales as an injustice to her tribe."'
Likewise, when George Jones was appointed chief in 1925, he
followed the recommendation of the General Council, which con-
tinued to function without Bureau recognition, that he sign all but
the deed to the Emohocka Mission lands. 2 Because he couldn't ac-
quire the signature of an appointed chief for the Emohocka deed,
the Secretary of Interior finally signed it himself, pursuant to a
provision in the 1906 Five Tribes Act."3
During this period of time Seminole citizens continued to seek a
voice in the management of their affairs, but .federal officials con-
tinued to block their effors. In 1927 a Seminole Council, identical
in form to the council described in the 1903 Revised Statutes, was
organized. Harry Hully Tiger, the Council chairman, requested
federal recognition of the Council as the official Seminole
representative, and inquired whether tribal elections could be
held."' The Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied Tiger's
108. Letter from Jos. M. Dixon, Acting Secretary of Interior to Frank J. Boudinot (June
29, 1929) (N.A., N.R.D.). Letter from C.J. Rhoades, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to
Chili Fish (Sept. 28, 1929) (N.A., N.R.D.), where the Commissioner summarized Section 6
and stated: "The above act does not provide for an election of the principal chief of said na-
tion."
109. 304 Stat. 137 (1906), § 6. See also30 Stat. 567 (1898).
110. Letter from Thomas McGeisey and Chili Fish to Charles H. Burke, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs (June 21, 1923) (N.A., N.R.D.); Letter from Charles H. Burke, Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, to John Wesley (Nov. 9, 1923) (N.A., N.R.D.); Letter from Chili
Fish to the Superintendent of the Five Tribes Agency (May 4, 1931) (N.A., N.R.D.); Letter
from C.J. Rhoades, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to John Burgess (July 26, 1932) (N.A.,
N.R.D.) [hereinafter cited as McGeisey, Burke, Fish, and Rhoades letters].
111. Letter from Alice B. Davis to Acting Superintendent (June 26, 1923) (N.A.,
N.R.ID.).
112. Letter from Acting Superintendent to Charles H. Burke, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs (Jan. 18, 1926) (N.A., N.R.D.).
113. Letter from E.B. Meritt, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Nina and Nellie Tanyan
and Isaac Jones (Mar. 16, 1928) (N.A., N.R.D.).
114. Letter from Harry Hully Tiger to the Secretary of Interior (July 21, 1927) (N.A.,
N.R.D.).
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request."' Similarly, the Secretary of Interior refused to recognize
the Council's authority in 1929, when he declined to approve an
attorney's contract made with the Council."6 That same year, the
Commissioner refused to acknowledge the need for a chief,
because "there are now no tribal deeds or any other unfinished
business requiring action by a Principal Chief at this time." ''"7
The struggle between the federal administrators and tribal
members continued into the 1930's. In 1931 the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs refused to pay the train fare and other expenses for
a delegation of Seminoles to go to Washington to examine certain
records, stating: "It is not stated in your letter what object the
Seminoles have in mind in desiring a delegation to examine the
records and papers referred to in your letter, nor does it appear
what good purpose would be served or what benefit the tribe
would be derived there from.""' 8 The Commissioner cited Section
19 of the Act of May 18, 1916, which prohibits the expenditure of
tribal funds without specific appropriations by Congress, except
for certain purposes,"9 as authority for his decision not to release
funds to the tribe. This interpretation of the 1916 Act was ironic,
because the cited provision was actually intended by Congress to
protect the Five Tribes from Bureau mismanagement of tribal
funds. '2
Early in 1931, Chili Fish was appointed chief by the President of
the United States, for the purpose of signing the deed to the
Mekasukey lands, the last 320 acres owned by the tribe.'' He
declined the appointment, stating: "Consistent with the attitude of
the members of the Seminole group in connection with the ar-
bitrary closing of the Mekasukey Academy, the property of the
Seminole people, we look askance upon the policies of the Depart-
ment with reference to matters pertaining to our properties and in-
terests."' 2 Probably the Secretary would have sold the land
115. Letter from Charles H. Burke, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Harry Tiger (July
26, 1927) (N.A., N.R.D.).
116. Letter from Jos. M. Dixon, Acting Secretary of Interior to Frank J. Boudinot (June
29, 1929) (N.A., N.R.D.).
117. Letter from C.J. Rhoades, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Chili Fish (Sept. 28,
1929) (N.A., N.R.D.).
118. Letter from C.J. Rhoades, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to W.E. Tiger (Apr. 10,
1931) (N.A., N.R.D.).
119. 39 Stat. 123, 148 (1916). This provision was made permanent by 42 Stat. 552, 575
(1922), 25 U.S.C. § 124 (1970).
120. According to Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F.Supp. 1110, 1134 (D.D.C. 1976), this legisla-
tion was the result of the obvious abuse by the Secretary of his control over tribal
disbursements.
121. Letter from Chili Fish to A.M. Landman, Superintendent of the Five Tribes Agency
(May 4, 1931) (N.A., N.R.D.).
122. I.d.
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without the signature of a chief, as he did in the case of the
Emohocka lands, if Congress had not intervened by the Act of
April 27, 1932.'"
That Act required the approval of the Seminole General Coun-
cil "selected in pursuance of Seminole customs" for all sales,
leases, encumbrances, or other dispositions of tribal lands. In spite
of this obvious congressional recognition of the Council's general
authority over tribal affairs, the Commissioner stated in a letter
shortly after the passage of the Act that the need for a Seminole
Council would arise only when the disposition of tribal property
was involved, and cited the 1932 act as authority.' He also re-
fused at that time to recognize elections for chief which had been
held by two factions of the tribe, for the usual reason that "there is
therefore no existing authority of law for the election of Principal
Chief by the Seminole Indians."'"
Two years later the Act of June 18, 1934, known as the Indian
Reorganization Act (I.R.A.), was enacted, reflecting a new con-
gressional policy which was more favorable to tribal self-
government.'26 Due to pressures from Oklahoma congressmen, the
I.R.A. expressly made most of its important sections, including
those providing a method of organizing tribal government, inap-
plicable to Oklahoma tribes.'27 However, this situation was
remedied in 1936 when Congress passed the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act (O.I.W.A.), which was designed to meet the special
needs of Oklahoma Indians." The O.I.W.A. authorized the
Secretary to acquire lands for individuals and tribes to be held in
trust, free of all taxes, except a state gross production tax on oil
and gas;'29 gave the Secretary a preference in the purchase of the
lands of the restricted Indians;'3 ° provided a method or organiza-
tion of tribal government pursuant to rules and regulations
created by the Secretary of Interior;'3 ' allowed the creation of
cooperative associations by Indian groups;'32 provided that
Oklahoma laws would govern matters concerning the cooperative
associations not covered by the act, regulations, or charter;'
123. 47 Stat. 140 (1932).
124. Letter from C.J. Rhoades, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to John Burgess (July
26, 1932) (N.A., N.R.D.).
125. Id.
126. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 etseq. (1970).
127. 25 U.S.C. § 473 (1970).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
129. Id.
130. 25 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
131. 25 U.S.C. § 503 (1970).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 504 (1970).
133. Id.
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authorized the Secretary to remove suits involving the cooperative
associations to federal court; 34 authorized loans to individuals or
corporate groups;' 31 made I.R.A. funds available to Oklahoma
tribes;'3 6 and authorized the Secretary of Interior to make the
necessary rules and regulations.'
3
The Seminoles more or less ignored both the Secretary's refusal
to acknowledge their governmental authority and the O.I.W.A.
provisions for incorporation of tribal governments. Sometime
around 1934 Seminole citizens drafted a brief organizational docu-
ment for the tribe.' The Council continued to meet throughout
the 1930's, discussing topics such as a waterwell easement, the
reimbursement of the expenses of a geological survey, the appoint-
ment of a committee to help indigent members, insurance for the
Mekasukey Mission buildings, a resolution against use of intox-
icants, a protest against the location of an agency at Wewoka, the
retainer of an attorney, construction of a tribal building, and the
creation of a tribal newspaper.'0 The superintendent of the Five
Tribes Agency viewed these meetings with a paternalistic attitude,
stating:
The Seminole Indians are interested in organization as a
tribe; however, there are a number of hurdles to jump before
any effective action may be taken. The principal question is
that of the share of the Seminole freedmen in any tribal assets
or tribal organization. The matter of organization should not
be pressed at this time, but should await a clarification of the
legal aspect of a Seminole organization under the Thomas-
Rogers Act."'
Regardless of the hesitancy of the Bureau to "press" organiza-
tion of the tribe, the Seminoles continued their Council meetings
in the 1940's."' On November 22, 1944, the Council met with the
134. 25 U.S.C. § 505 (1970).
135. 25 U.S.C. § 506 (1970).
136. 25 U.S.C. § 507 (1970).
137. 25 U.S.C. § 509 (1970).
138. C'onstitution and By-Laws of the Executive Committee of the Seminole Nation.
dated June 12, 1934 (private files of William Wantland, former Attorney General for the
Seminole Nation, Seminole, Okla. [hereinafter cited as Wantland Files].
139. Minutes of Seminole Council meetings dated Oct. 5, Nov. 2, Nov. 18, and Nov. 30.
1938 (forwarded to Department of Interior on Dec. 21, 1938) (N.A., N.R.D.); Minutes of
Seminole Council meetings of Mar. 1 and June 19, 1939 (forwarded to Department of In-
terior, July 1, 1939) (N.A., N.R.D.); Letter from Eugene Wheeler, Assistant Superintendent
to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, enclosing minutes of Seminole Council meeting dated
July 5, 1939 (July 18, 1939), (N.A., N.R.D.).
140. Letter from A.M. Landlam, Superintendent, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs
(Dec. 21.1938) (N.A., N.R.D.).
141. Minutes of Seminole Council meetings dated Oct. 27 and Nov. 29, 1944 (forwarded
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/3
House Committee on Indian Affairs in Muskogee and requested
that a clinic and council house be constructed on Mekasukey land,
that appropriations be made to finance local government, that
prohibition be continued for the tribe and enforced by tribal of-
ficers, that restrictions be continued, that the school system be ap-
proved, and that a special commission be created to hear claims
by the tribe against the government. "2 According to a Council
resolution passed a few days after the meeting, these same sugges-
tions had been made five years before, obviously without
results. "' The Council also passed a resolution in 1944 requesting
the President to appoint Waddie Gibbs chief.' Apparently, by
this time the Department had shifted to a policy of issuing cer-
tificates of appointment to the elected chiefs.
In 1952 the federal-tribal relationship showed some signs of im-
provement when Congress enacted the Act of July 3, 1952. "' This
act provided that the Five Tribes could make contracts involving
tribal money or property with the approval of the Secretary of In-
terior pursuant to such rules and regulations as he might prescribe.
That same year a small budget was authorized by the BIA for the
operation of Seminole government in 1953. " ' However, these ac-
tions favoring Seminole self-government were the exception rather
than the rule in the 1950's. Although the Seminole Nation escaped
the termination legislation of that period, its struggle with federAl
administrators continued..
As usual, this struggle involved the refusal of the BIA to
recognize the elected chief and Council as the valid representatives
of the tribe. This time, rather than denying the authority of the
tribe to organize, federal officials questioned the validity of the
selection of the chief and Council in terms of tribal law. Marcy
Cully, the elected chief, was given a certificate of appointment by
the Secretary on November 20, 1952,' 4' but in 1953 the Council ex-
to Department of Interior on May 2, 1945) (N.A., N.R.D.); Resolution of the Seminole
General Council (June 22, 1948) (N.A., N.R.D.); Minutes of Seminole Council meetings
(Aug. 21, 1945, Feb. 19, 1946, Apr. 23, 1946, May 7, 1946, June 18, 1946, July 16, 1946,
Oct. 15, 1946, Dec. 10, 1946, Jan. 21, 1947, Apr. 15, 1947, June 22, 1948, July 5, 1948, Apr.
19, 1949, July 19, 1949, Aug. 26, 1949, Oct. 18, 1949) (private files of Charles Grounds, at-'
torney, Seminole, Okla. [hereinafter cited as Grounds Files].
142. Resolution of the Seminole General Council (Nov. 29, 1944) (Grounds Files).
143. Id.
144. Resolution of the Seminole General Council (1944) (Grounds Files).
145. 66 Stat. 323 (1952). This act amended 34 Stat. 137, § 28 (1906) which required
presidentialapproval of contracts by the tribes involving the expenditure of money.
146. Bureau of Indian Affairs Operating Statement, Muskogee Area, Five Civilized
Tribes Agency, Seminole Tribal Budget, 1953 Program (Grounds Files).
147. Letter from Paul Fickinger, Area Director, to Charles Grounds (Dec. 21, 1954)
(Grounds Files).
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pressed concern that the Bureau was not paying Cully his salary
and complained that this was retarding the exercise of tribal
government. "8 At some point during Cully's tenure a petition signed
by 300 people protesting Cully's appointment was presented to the
Secretary of Interior, and he revoked Cully's certificate of ap-
pointment. "' In spite of the revocation and the apparent fac-
tionalism within the tribe, Cully served out his term, which ended
in 1956." One Seminole citizen, an attorney, evaluated the situa-
tion as follows: "Under tribal laws, Marcy Cully must remain our
Chief until he resigns or is removed from office by impeachment
procee.dings .... Under these tribal laws, the Seminoles have an
election every four years .... ,,"'
During this same period of time, the Council of the Five Civilized
Tribes adopted a resolution advocating the continuance of the of-
fices of the Five Tribes in response to rumors that the BIA was
maneuvering to eliminate the chieftainships." ' To some extent this
rumor proved to be true, because Cully was the last Seminole
chief appointed by the Department of Interior.'53 After the revoca-
tion of Cully's appointment, the Bureau refused to recognize the
validity of any of Cully's actions, even those actions which he
took prior to the revocation of the certificate. Thus, in 1954 the
area director refused to approve an attorney's contract approved
by Cully, and took the position that delegates appointed by Cully
could not participate in an upcoming meeting of the Inter-Tribal
Council of the Five Civilized Tribes.''
There is some evidence that the Bureau's failure to recognize the
authority of a chief during this time arose from a genuine confu-
sion as to who had the official recognition of the tribe. In late 1954
the acting area director of the Muskogee office met with groups
for the purpose of determining who should be appointed, but
without success.' 5 There was also concern by the Bureau as to the
148. Minutes of the Seminole Executive Board meeting (May 9, 1953) (Grounds Files).
149. Letter from Charles Grounds to Arthur Jones (Mar. 25, 1955) (Grounds Files).
150. Resolution of the General Council (May 22, 1954) (Grounds Files), requesting the
Secretary to extend the certificate to July, 1956, when Cully's term was to expire under
tribal law; Letter from Charles Grounds to Arthur Jones (Mar. 25, 1955), saying that in
spite of the revocation of the certificate, Cully should remain chief under tribal law
(Grounds Files).
151. Letter from Charles Grounds to Arthur Jones (Mar. 25, 1955) (Grounds Files).
152. Muskogee Daily Phoenix, July 15, 1954, at p. 1. col. 1.
153. H. REP. No. 766, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1932) [hereinafter cited as H. REP I.
154. Letter from Paul Fickinger, Area Director, to Charles Grounds (Dec. 21, 1954)
(Grounds Files); Letter from Paul Fickinger, Area Director, to Charles Grounds (Dec. 22,
1954) (Grounds Files).
155. Letter from F.M Haverland, Acting Area Director to Jeffie Brown, George Gibbs,
Phillip Walker, and Henry Jones (Nov. 17, 1954) (Grounds Files).
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identities of the Council members of the tribe. The area director
sent out lists of those people whom he thought were the various
band leaders to various tribal members, asking if the lists were ac-
curate."" In 1955 the area director felt he had secured sufficient cer-
tification from the various bands, and apparently met with the
Council on several occasions. '
However, at least some Seminole citizens viewed the director's
activities as a means of acquiring control over the tribal govern-
ment, rather than what he considered a good faith attempt to
respect the wishes of the people. In 1958 a group of tribal members
formed a committee for reorganization and discussed the pro-
blems they had been having. They evaluated the situation as
follows:
Copies of letters and memorandum from the Indian office
show that what little authority that is left to the tribe is
vested first in the Chief with the Council in a strong advisory
capacity. This is the stated position taken by the Department
over many years, yet for some strange reason, the Govern-
ment will not permit the Seminoles to have a Chief. The
Government violated its own directives by trying to deal
through the appointed Chairman. '
The minutes of the meeting further state:
That the so-called Council does not have true representation
by election of the Tribal Bands as is required under the Tribal
laws; that incumbent members have been appointed and ap-
proved by the Indian Office and that certain individual
members of the Council have appointed themselves to the
Council, which is strictly forbidden by our Tribal law; that
funds have been disbursed by a Chairman who has no
authority whatsoever to authorize disbursements; that the
Indian Office under the present set up through its collusion
with the ignorant incompetent group is fraudulently and
wrongfully spending monies of the Seminole Tribe and that
some action must be taken immediately to prevent an ir-
reparable injury to the Tribe.'9
156. Id.
157. Letter from Paul Fickinger, Area Director, to Thomas Coker (Mar. 25, 1955)
(Grounds Files).
158. Minutes of the meeting of a committee for reorganization (May 24, 1958) (Grounds
Files).
159. Id.
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Although it is unclear whether any new Council elections were
held after the 1958 meeting, the Council continued to meet and
discuss tribal matters, and at least one mass meeting occurred in
1961. " Finally on March 28, 1964, the Council created a constitu-
tional committee comprised of one representative from each of the
fourteen bands.'6 ' The Committee worked on the constitution with
the assistance of the BIA for several years, but the Council con-
sistently found the draft objectionable and refused to submit it to
the people for a referendum.'62 In 1968 a petition containing ap-
proximately 600 signatures was submitted to the Council re-
questing a referendum.' 3 At this point the Bureau brought some
pressure to bear on the Council, and on March 8, 1969, the con-
stitution was submitted to the voters' 4 and was approved by a
vote of 637 for and 249 against.'"
Although the drafters of the 1969 "Constitution of the Seminole
Nation of Oklahoma" reviewed the 1903 Revised Statutes and
other organizational documents drafted in later years,' 6 the new
constitution contains some basic changes which reflect to some ex-
tent the confusion concerning the allotment legislation and the
years of administrative subjugation which the tribe has endured.
First, the new constitution contains no delegation of judicial
power over tribal members to the tribal government. Second, it
eliminates the tribal town concept by providing that Council
representatives are to be selected from the fourteen clans, rather
than tribal towns. 6 7 It does not provide for town chiefs nor the
special powers which they had under the old laws. Third, the con-
stitution subjects the authority of the Council to the laws and con-
stitution of the state.'" Fourth, it expressly recognizes the superior
authority of the United States where the selection of the principal
chief is involved.'6W Finally, the 1969 constitution expressly
recognizes the authority of the Bureau in some areas. Although
160. Meeting of Seminole Indian Committee (Sept. 23, 1961) (Grounds Files).
161. Resolution of the General Council of the Seminole Nation (Mar. 28, 1964).
162. Interview with William C. Wantland, former Attorney General of the Seminole Na-
tion, phone conversation in Oklahoma City (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Wantland In-
terview].
163. Petition to the Hon. Secretary of the Interior, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and
General Council of the Seminole Nation (undated).
164. Constitution of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma (adopted Mar. 8, 1969).
165. rd.
166. Wantland Interview, supra note 162.
167. Constitution of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, art. IV, § 1.
168. rd., art. V.
169. rd., art. III, § 3.
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the constitution was not adopted pursuant to the O.I.W.A., the
tribe secured ratification by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs."
The constitution also acknowledges the importance of the Com-
missioner by requiring the chief to call a special Council meeting
upon his request, providing for a waiver of notice by the Commis-
sioner in an emergency.' 7'
In addition to the reorganization of the tribe, the late 1960's and
early 1970's also brought the passage of three pieces of federal
legislation favorable to Seminole government. The Act of October
17, 1968, made school and judgment funds totaling more than
$200,000 available to the tribe to be expended or invested for any
purpose authorized by the General Council or other recognized
governing body with the approval of the Secretary of Interior.'7 1
The tribe used some of these funds for assistance to Seminole
students, a housing program, tribal council expenses, and a new
tribal building. 3 In the second statute enacted during this period,
the Act of May 7, 1970, Congress provided that the restricted
lands, and rents and profits therefrom, owned by a Five Tribes
member dying intestate without heirs, would escheat to his tribe."
That same year Congress reaffirmed the power of the Seminole
people to select their leaders by passing the Act of October 22,
1970, which provided for the popular selection of principal chiefs
of the Five Tribes."5
In summary, this brief overview of the relations between federal
officials and the Seminole people shows that the former has
generally had the upper hand in tribal affairs for approximately
the last seventy years. However, the following legal analysis will
show that the Bureau's control has often been unsupported by
federal law, and as one court recently termed it, has amounted to
"bureaucratic imperialism.""'7 In spite of this misuse of power, the
Seminole people have demonstrated throughout the years that
they have never relinquished the principle that they are a govern-
mental entity capable of dealing with their own affairs.
170. Id., art. XIV.
171. Id., art. VI, § 1.
172. 82 Stat. 1148 (1968).
173. S. REP. No. 1594, supra note 3.
174. 25 U.S.C. § 375d (1970).
175. 84 Stat. 1091 (1970).
176. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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IV. The Meaning of Tribal Termination:
A Comparison of Five Tribes Legislation With
The Termination Legislation of the 1950's
The word "termination" is generally used to describe the cessa-
tion of the special federal-Indian relationship. During the 1950's
Congress enacted legislation which affected this change in status
for more than a dozen tribes, most notably, the Menominee and
Klamath tribes.'" This type of legislation has been described as
follows:
The thrust was to eliminate the reservations and to turn In-
dian Affairs over to the states. Indians would become subject
to state control without any federal support or restrictions.
Indian land would no longer be held in trust and would be
fully taxable and alienable, just like non-Indian land in the
states. Special federal health, education, and general
assistance programs for Indians would end.'78
A less well-known use of the word "termination" is its special
application to the Five Tribes. Years before Congress began its ter-
mination policy, Felix Cohen, one of the most noted and
authoritative scholars of Indian law, used the word to describe the
effect of federal legislation on the governments of the Five Tribes.
In his famous Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Cohen described
various provisions of the Five Tribes allotment legislation which
he viewed as effecting the destruction of tribal government, and
labeled it "termination.""'7 Cohen's description of the termination
of the governments of the Five Tribes further implied that all tribal
property interests and all tribal affairs were eventually disposed
of, that the tribal governments ceased to function, and that tribal
members became ordinary citizens. As the legislation of the 1950's
produced similar results, and was also labeled "termination"
legislation, it is generally believed and concluded by legal scholars
who have read Cohen's book, but who are unfamiliar with
Oklahoma tribes, that the Five Tribes have the same legal status as
the Klamaths and the other tribes terminated pursuant to the ter-
mination acts of the 1950's. This assumption is erroneous. As will
be discussed later, Cohen's conclusion concerning termination of
tribal government was inaccurate. Furthermore, there are several
177. 25 U.S.C. § 564-564X (1970) (Klamath Tribe); 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1970),
repealed by Menominee Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (Supp. 1975) (Menominee
Tribe).
178. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 1, at 140.
179. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 429, 430.
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fundamental differences in the legislation affecting the Five Tribes
and the termination legislation of the 1950's. Although the policies
behind the two types of legislation were similar, and the practical
result of impairing the exercise of tribal self-government was the
same, the substantive legal effect of the legislation varies
significantly. A recent study of the termination legislation of the
1950's distills into several basic elements,' an approach that will
be utilized here.
Land Ownership Patterns
The 1950's termination legislation effected a fundamental
change in land ownership patterns because most of the lands of the
terminated tribes were sold.'8 ' The Five Tribes allotment legislation
had a similar impact on the land ownership patterns of the
Seminole Nation. By treaty the tribe owned its land in fee,' 2 and
individuals had certain occupancy rights according to tribal law.' 3
The Seminole Agreement of 1898 provided for the allotment of
lands to individual Seminoles, and the conveyance of all right and
title in the land to the allottees when the tribal government ceased
to exist.'" The Five Tribes Act of 1906 provided that patents could
be issued to Seminole citizens prior to the dissolution of tribal
government.'" By 1903 most of the Seminole land had been allot-
ted in fee to individual Seminoles.'" These lands quickly fell into
non-Indian hands.'87 At present, of the 369,854 acres of land
180. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 1, at 152-54.
181. Id. at 152.
182. Pursuant to the Treaty of Mar. 21, 1866, 14 Stat. 755, art. III, the Seminoles sold
their lands to the United States and purchased a new tract of land ceded by the
Creeks"which shall constitute the national domain of the Seminole Indians."
183. While the enrolled members of the Five Tribes undoubtedly had a vested equitable
right to their just share of communal lands against strangers and fellow members of their
tribes, they had no separate or individual right to or equity in any of those lands which they
could maintain against the legislation of the United States or of the Indian nations.
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
174 U.S. 56 (1899); a tribe with respect to tribal lands was not limited by rights of occupan-
cy which might grant to its members, and the occupancy of tribal land did not create any
vested rights in the occupant as against the tribe, Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 444, 447
(1914); Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 642 (1912); Hayes v. Barringer, 168 F. 221, 222 (8th
Cir. 1907).
184. 30 Stat. 567 (1898). The agreement transmuted the tribe's communal estate to
private ownership in severalty by its enrolled members prior to theactual issuance of
patents, Moore v. Carter Oil Co., 43 F.2d 322, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 903 (1930).
185. 34 Stat. 137, § 6 (1906).
186. 10 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 37. By 1903 all but 18,630 acres had been
allotted, most of which was later allotted to children born after the first rolls. Id., 12, at 32-
33.
187. Seminoles began to lose their lands immediately after allotment, often contrary to
law, Letter from Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Secretary of Interior (Apr. 21, 1909)
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originally owned by the tribe, only 29,744 acres of restricted lands
remain in the hands of individual Seminoles, and only 380.10
acres remain in tribal ownership.'
Trust Relationship
The termination legislation of the fifties ended the trust relation-
ship between the United States and the affected tribes, thus ending
federal protections against the sale of land and the availability of
federal expertise in land and resource management.' "° While the
end of the trust relationship between the Seminole Nation was ob-
viously part of the future goal of assimilation, it was not intended
to be an immediate result of the allotment legislation. The Five
Tribes Act of 1906 restricted the lands of fullbloods from sale for a
25-year period,'" and provided that tribal lands "upon the
dissolution of said tribes, shall not become public lands nor pro-
perty of the United States, but shall be held in trust by the United
States for the use and benefit of the Indians respectively compris-
ing each of said tribes. . . . ""', In 1908, restrictions were removed
from all lands of Five Tribes members except homestead lands
belonging to those of half or more Indian blood, and all allotted
lands (both homestead and surplus) belonging to those of three-
quarters or more Indian blood.' 2 The restriction on homestead
lands was extended by successive acts,' 3 but under current law all
restrictions cease at death. "4 However, any sales of such lands by
heirs cf one-half or more Indian blood must be approved in state
district court.' 5 All funds and securities of Five Tribes members of
(N.A., N.R.D.); Letter from John F. Brown, Chief of the Seminole Nation, to the Secretary
of Interior (Feb. 23, 1911) (N.A., N.R.D.); Chief, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Aug.
6, 1915) The Act of May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. 312 placed restrictions only upon the
homestead lands of Seminoles of one-half or more Indian blood, and all allotted lands (both
surplus and homestead) of Seminoles of three-quarters or more Indian blood, leaving a
great dezl of Seminole land unprotected. The Act removed restrictions from a total of 8
million acres of land belonging to Five Tribes members. 15 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68,
at 3. Land losses of Seminole allottees were so severe that the 1913 Appropriations Act, 38
Stat. 77, 95, authorized per capita payments from the tribal trust funds "'to relieve the
distressed.condition at present existing among the allottees of that tribe ......
188. Annual Land Report, BIA, Muskogee Area Office (Sept. 30, 1977).
189. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 1, at 152.
190. 34 Stat. 137, § 19 (1906).
191. Id., § 27.
192. 35 Stat. 312, § 1 (1908).
193. The restriction period was extended to Apr. 26, 1956, by 45 Stat. 495 (1928), and
was extended for the lives of the Indians owning restricted lands by 69 Stat. 666 (1955).
194. 61 Stat. 731, § 1.
195. Id.
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one-half or more Indian blood are to remain restricted until other-
wise provided by law. ""
The Secretary's involvement in management of tribal resources
is further evidence of the trust relationship between the United
States and the Seminole Nation. The Secretary has the power to
dispose of tribal property with the approval of the tribal council, '
to make rules and regulations concerning contracts between the
Five Tribes and private entities,' 0 to approve the expenditure of
Seminole judgment funds,' and to make loans to the tribe.2"°
Although there are now only 29,744 acres of privately owned
Seminole restricted lands and 380 acres of tribal trust lands, the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act has authorized the Secretary of In-
terior to acquire trust lands for Oklahoma tribes,"' and a 1970 act
provides for the escheat of the lands of intestate members of the
Five Tribes dying without heirs to the respective tribes, to be held
in trust for them. 2 Thus, the trust relationship between the
Seminole Tribe and the federal government continues to the pre-
sent time.
State JudicialA uthority
The 1950's termination legislation ended federal recognition of
the reservations of the affected tribes and jurisdiction in all
criminal and civil cases was vested in the state courts. 3 The
practical result of the Five Tribes allotment legislation was
similar. A brief overview of the federal legislation involving
jurisdiction over Seminoles, however, indicates the legal effect of
that legislation was not a blanket grant of exclusive jurisdiction
over Seminoles to the state. Admittedly, the subject of jurisdiction
in Oklahoma is an exceedingly complex problem, but it is ap-
propriate at this time to at least raise the issues concerning the
validity of state jurisdiction over Seminoles.
Prior to 1889 the tribal courts in Indian Territory possessed ex-
clusive jurisdiction over tribal members, and a state of lawlessness
existed in controversies involving non-Indian intruders.2" In 1889
196. Id., § S.
197. 47 Stat. 140 (1932).
198. 25 U.S.C. § 82a (1970).
199. 82 Stat. 1148 (1968).
200. 25 U.S.C. § 506 (1970).
201. 25 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
202. 25 U.S.C. § 375d (1970).
203. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 1, at 153.
204. See Leak Glove Mfg. Co. v. Needles, 69 F. 68 (8th Cir. 1895).
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Congress established federal courts in Indian Territory, ' and in
1890 the Organic Act granted the federal courts jurisdiction over
all civil and criminal cases, except those cases arising in one of the
Indian nations involving tribal members only.' The Act of June 7,
1897, gave the United States courts "exclusive jurisdiction" to try
all civil and criminal cases in Indian Territory,2" and the 1898 Cur-
tis Act abolished tribal courts..2 " These provisions of the 1897 and
1898 acts did not affect Seminole tribal jurisdiction, however. The
1898 Seminole Agreement repealed all provisions of the 1897 law
"in any manner affecting the proceedings of the general council of
the Seminole Nation."" In House debate of ratification of the
agreement, this provision was explained as follows: "The law of
1897, which took away the Indian Courts and certain rights of the
general council of the Seminole Nation is repealed, and this law is
to take its place. '' -2o
As previously discussed herein, the Curtis Act did not affect the
Seminole Nation insofar as it was inconsistent to the Seminole
Agreement. "' The abolition of tribal courts, which was to become
effective on the same day on which the Seminole Agreement was
ratified by Congress," ' was inconsistent with the Agreement and
thus ineffective. The Agreement granted federal courts only
limited jurisdiction by providing: "And the court of said Seminole
Nation shall retain all jurisdiction which they now have, except as
herein transferred to the Court of the United States." 2' The only
jurisdiction transferred to the federal courts by the agreement was
exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies growing out of the ti-
tle, ownership, occupation, or use of real estate owned by the
Seminoles, and exclusive jurisdiction to try all persons tried for
205. 25 Stat. 783 (1889).
206. 26 Stat. 81 (1890), §§ 30, 31, amended29 Stat. 510 (1897).
207. :50 Stat. 62, 83 (1897), repealedas to Seminoles, 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
208. 30 Stat. 495, § 28 (1898).
209. 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
210. 31 CONG. REC. 5575 (1898). See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,
302 (1942);"[Tihe Seminole Tribal government was not only to continue after the Curtis
Act but was in fact relieved of the necessity of securing presidential approval of its legisla-
tion by an agreement ratified three days after the passage of that statute."
211. 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
212. The abolition of tribal courts was to be effective July 1, 1898, pursuant to Section
28 of the Curtis Act, 30 Stat. 495 (1898). The Seminole Agreement was ratified by Congress
July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 567.
213. 30 Stat. 567 (1898). The legislative history of the ratification of the Seminole agree-
ment shows that Congress intended to recognize the judicial authority of the Seminole
courts over most controversies as long as the tribe continued in existence. See discussion at
note 81, supra.
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homicide, embezzlement, bribery, and embracery thereafter com-
mitted in the Seminole country, without reference to race or
citizenship of the person charged with such crime."' Thus, the
tribal court retained its jurisdiction over all matters involving only
tribal members, with the exception of the above enumerated
cases."s
The enabling act made state courts the successor of "all courts of
original jurisdiction of said Territories." ' 6 It is outside the scope of
the present discussion to give a full analysis of the meaning of this
provision. However, it appears that since the federal courts in In-
dian Territory possessed only limited jurisdiction over Seminoles,:
the state courts succeeded only to that limited jurisdiction insofar
as jurisdiction over Seminoles is concerned. There is a general,
presumption in law against repeal by implication of earlier legisla-
tion, in this case the Seminole Agreement, especially where the
established legal rights of Indians under federal legislation or
treaties are involved."'
In addition to limiting state jurisdiction over the Seminole Na-
tion to that jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by the
Seminole Agreement, the enabling act expressly limits state
jurisdiction over the disposition of all Indian lands located in the
state, by protecting the jurisdiction of the United States over "all
lands.., owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation." ' Consis-
tent with this provision, in the years since statehood Congress has
always been careful to define state court involvement in the
disposition of Five Tribes lands,' and in such instances the state
courts are viewed as federal, rather than state, instrumentalities.' °
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 34 Stat. 267, § 19 (1906).
217. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1972); United States v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
218. 34 Stat. 267, § 3 (1906).
219. Federal legislation has provided for approval by the Oklahoma courts of certain
conveyances of restricted lands, 35 Stat. 495, § 9, (1908), as amended by 44 Stat. 239
(1926); the final determination of heirship of allottees by Oklahoma probate courts, 25
U.S.C. § 375, (1970): exclusive jurisdiction by Oklahoma courts of all guardianship matters
affecting Indians of the Five Tribes, and all proceedings to administer estates or probate
wills, 61 Stat. 731; 35 Stat. 312 § 3 (1947). But even in those situations where Congress has
conferred jurisdiction on state courts over the disposition of the lands of Five Tribes
members, their powers may be limited, Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235 (1919); Armstrong
v. Maple Leaf Apartments, 508 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1975).
220. The county courts of Oklahoma are recognized as federal agencies for the removal
of qualified restrictions on lands of Five Tribes members, and for the approval of con-
veyances of inherited land, United States v. Easely, 33 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. Okla. 1940).
The Oklahoma court, in approving a deed pursuant to 61 Stat. 731 (1947), acts as a federal
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Thus, although a judicial determination of the extent of state
jurisdiction over Seminole citizens and their lands remains for the
future, it is clear that state jurisdiction is not absolute,22' so that in
instrumentality and in an administrative capacity, Springer v. Townsend, 336 F.2d 397
(10th Cir. 1964) and Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apartments, 508 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1975).
In approving deeds to fullblood heirs of inherited lands, the state court acts as a federal in-
strumentality, United States v. Goldfeder, 112 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1940).
221. Contra, ExparteNowabbi, 61 P.2d 1139 (1939), where it was held that the criminal
laws of the state applies to Indians in that part of the state that was formerly the Indian Ter-
ritory, and that they are not subject to federal law, except in the cases where Congress has
so expressly provided. That case turned upon a determination by the court that a Choctaw
restricted allotment was not Indian country. The court based this conclusion on 34 Stat.
182 (1906) (18 U.S.C. § 349), which provides: "At the expiration of the trust period and
when tl e lands have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee.., then each and every
allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the
State or Territory in which they may reside; and no Territory shall pass or enforce any law
denying any such Indian within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law... Provided further, That until the issuance of fee-simple patents all allottees to
whom trust patents shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States: And
provided further, That the provisions of this act shall not extend to any Indians in the
former Indian Territory." The court reasoned that since the provision, which retained ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction over all allottees until the issuance of fee-simple patents, also ex-
pressly made its provisions inapplicable to Indian Territory, then "the obvious
purpose... of said act was to take the Indians in the Indian Territory out of the category of
Reservation Indians." Id. at 1154. The court erred in this interpretation. As the legal
history of the Seminoles contained in this article has shown, the tribes in western
Oklahoma are governed by the Dawes Act, and the Five Tribes are governed by a different
set of allotment laws. The Nowabbicourt failed to note that 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (now 25
U.S.C. -j 349) was an amendment to the DawesAct, so that it was natural for Congress to
include the provision excluding the tribes of Indian Territory from its application, par-
ticularly since this amendment was enacted a month after passage of the 1906 Five Tribes
Act.
Moreover, the court failed to note that unlike the Dawes Act, none of the allotment
legislation affecting the Five Tribes expressly made state law applicable to allottees at the
expiration of the trust period. Furthermore, even if the Nowabbi case was good law in
1936, it is not good law today. The definition of "Indian country" was amended in 1948 to
include "all Indian allotments the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished," 18
U.S.C. § 1151, and the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over certain offenses com-
mitted within Indian country, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242. For the effect of this amendment of
the definition of Indian country on prior case law affecting tribes in western Oklahoma, see
State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1978), where it was held that the state did not have
jurisdiction over the murder of a Kiowa man allegedly committed by another Kiowa on a
Kiowa trust allotment, and United States v. Littlechief, No. CR. 76-207-D, Nov. 7, 1977,
reprinted in State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1978), where it was held that the
United States had jurisdiction over the case.
Finally, it should be noted that the state never assumed jurisdiction over Indian country
in Oklahoma pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 83-280, 67 Stat. 1588-90 (1953) (now
codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1162, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1360 (1970). As
originally enacted in 1953, this law extended state criminal and civil jurisdiction in five
states, and allowed for similar assumptions of jurisdiction by other states in the future. The
Indian Civil Rights Act, 82 Stat. 78 (1968) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322), amended Public Law
83-280 by prohibiting the assumption of jurisdiction over a tribe by the state without tribal
consent. Thus, the Oklahoma tribes retain control over whether the state may assume
jurisdiction over those matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal and tribal
governments.
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this area Seminoles enjoy a status superior to that enjoyed by
members of the terminated tribes.
State Legislative Authority
The termination legislation of the 1950's granted the states
broad legislative authority over members of the tribes affected.
Similarly, the Five Tribes allotment legislation resulted in the im-
position of considerable state legislative control over Five Tribes
members. The Five Tribes legislation did not give it full and ex-
clusive jurisdiction over them, however.
Prior to statehood, Congress extended the application of
Arkansas laws over Indian Territory in areas such as estates, wills,
civil rights, marriage, and criminal law.222 Originally, these laws,
which were to be applied by the federal courts in Indian Territory,
were not applicable to matters involving only tribal members.2"
The Act of June 7, 1897, extended Arkansas laws to all persons in
Indian Territory "irrespective of race,"2' but as previously dis-
cussed, the Seminole Agreement repealed all provisions of the
1897 law "in any manner affecting the proceedings of the general
council of the Seminole Nation."' However, the Act of April 28,
1904, contained a provision similar to the 1897 act: "All the laws
of Arkansas heretofore put in force in Indian Territory are hereby
continued and extended in their operation, so as to embrace all
persons and estates in said Territory, whether Indian, freedman,
or otherwise .... "6 The question of whether, in passing this act,
Congress intended Seminole courts to enforce Arkansas laws,"7 is
outside the scope of the present discussion. Furthermore, it is
doubtful that the 1904 act survived the passage of the enabling act
because that act extended the laws in force in Oklahoma Ter-
ritory, rather than those in force in Indian Territory, over the new
state ."
The only provision of the enabling act specifically dealing with
state legislative authority states that "the laws in force in the Ter-
ritory of Oklahoma, as far as applicable, shall extend over and
222. 26 Stat. 81 (1890), § 31, amended29 Stat. 510 (1897); §§ 33, 34, 35, 38.
223. Id., §§ 30,31. amended29 Stat. 510 (1897).
224. 30 Stat. 62, 83 (1897), repealedas to the Seminoles, 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
225. 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
226. 33 Stat. 573, § 2 (1904).
227. The legislative history of the ratification of the Seminole Agreement shows that
Congress intended to recognize the legislative authority of the Seminole Council as long as
the tribe continued in existence, 31 CONG. REc. 5575 (1898); see note 81 supra for discus-
sion.
228. 34 Stat. 267, § 14 (1906).
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apply to said state until changed by the legislature thereof." '' The
phrase "as far as applicable" indicates Congress meant to restrict
state legislative authority to those matters not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal and tribal governments. The enabling
act further contains an express limitation on state legislative
authority by preserving the authority of the United States "to
make any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands,
property, or other rights by treaties, agreement, law, or other-
wise, which it would have been competent to make if this Act had
never been passed.""0 That this was a limitation on state jurisdic-
tion is evidenced by the fact that since statehood, when Congress
has seen fit to expressly make various Oklahoma property laws
applicable to Five Tribes members and their lands, it has expressly
done so by statute." Thus, while the extent of state legislative con-
trol is a complex subject requiring further analysis, it is clear that
Congress never expressly granted the state complete legislative
authority over Seminoles and their lands."
State Taxation
The termination legislation of the fifties ended the almost total
immunity from state taxation which the affected tribes and its
members enjoyed. While the Five Tribes allotment legislation did
not end all exemptions from state taxation authority, there has
been a movement by Congress in that direction since statehood, at
least insofar as taxation of lands is involved. In 1908 all of the
allotted Five Tribes' lands were subjected to taxation "and other
civil burdens," except for homestead allotments owned by tribal
229. Id., § 1.
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. Id., § 1.
231. State laws expressly applied to lands of Five Tribes members include the following:
laws providing for the partition of real estate, 25 U.S.C. § 355 (1970); laws covering the
sales of interests of minors and incompetents, 61 Stat. 731, § 1 (1947); oil and gas conserva-
tion laws, id. § 11; the state statute of limitations in some instances, 44 Stat. 239, § 2 (1926).
232. The United States Supreme Court has upheld congressional authority over
members of the Five Tribes and their lands since statehood. The United States is entitled to
maintain an action to set aside all conveyances made by a member of one of the Five Tribes
of restricted lands, Deming Inv. Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 471 (1912); Goat v. United
States, 224 U.S. 458 (1912); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912). A lease which
Congress, in the exercise of its power over allotted Cherokee lands, pronounces absolutely
void, cannot be validated or given any force in the state, and an Oklahoma statute attemp-
ting to do so is invalid in that respect, Bunch v. Cole, 263 U.S. 250 (1923). It is not compe-
tent for the state to enact or give effect to a local statute which disregards restrictions im-
posed by Congress on the alienation of Indian lands, Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S.
286 (1911). Congressional authority over restricted lands did not terminate when the
restrictions expired, and Congress had the power to impose restrictions on Choctaw lands,
Brader v. James. 246 U.S. 88 (1918).
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members of one-half or more Indian blood and all allotted lands
(both homestead and surplus) belonging to tribal members of
three-quarters or more Indian blood." A 1928 act further increased
state and federal taxation authority by providing that all minerals
produced after April 26, 1931, from restricted lands of Five Tribes
members would be subject to state and federal taxes." The Act
also limited the tax-exempt status of restricted lands to 160 acres
per person."
The tax-exempt status of lands improved somewhat in 1936
when Congress passed a law providing that lands held by any In-
dian subject to restrictions against alienation and purchased out of
trust or restricted funds were to be nontaxable until otherwise
directed by Congress. 6 The tax-exempt status of lands belonging
to members of the Five Tribes further improved when the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act was enacted that same year, pro-
viding for the acquisition by the Secretary of Interior of trust lands
on behalf of Oklahoma tribes or individuals, which were to be free
from "any and all taxes" except the state gross production tax on
minerals. 7 The 1947 Stigler Act, however, did not improve the
taxation situation, because it provided that all restrictions on Five
Tribes land were to end at the death of the owner, and continued
tax exemptions only "in the hands of such Indian during the
restricted period." 8 This tax status was reaffirmed by a 1955 act
which provided: "Any existing exemption from taxation that con-
stitutes a vested property right shall continue in force and effect
until it terminates by virtue of its own limitations."" ° Thus, the
tax-exempt status of Seminole lands has been reduced almost to a
state of dependency on statutory authority, rather than a reliance
on the original sovereignty of the tribe. The only real advantage
the Seminole Nation has over the terminated tribes in the area of
taxation of lands is the O.I.W.A. provision for the acquisition of
tax-exempt trust lands for Oklahoma tribes; but that provision is
beneficial only if implemented, and to date the Secretary of In-
terior has failed to do so to any large extent.
Special Federal Programs to Tribes and to Individuals
The termination legislation resulted in the discontinuance of all
special programs to the affected tribes and their members because
233. 35 Stat. 312, § 4 (1908).
234. 45 Stat. 495, § 3 (1928), amended by46 Stat. 1108, (1931); 49 Stat. 1160 (1936).
235. 45 Stat. 495, § 4 (1928), amended by46 Stat. 1108 (1931).
236. 25 U.S.C. § 412a (1970).
237. 25 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
238. 61 Stat. 731, §§ 1, 6(b) (1947).
239. 69 Stat. 666, § 5 (1955).
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eligibility for these programs generally depends on federal
recognition. " ° Because federal recognition of the Seminole Nation
has never been discontinued, both the tribe and its members are
eligible for federal programs. Today the Seminole Nation par-
ticipates in federal Indian housing and employment projects, and
tribal members are the recipients of federal health services and
financial assistance for education. "'
Tribal Sovereignty
Although the termination legislation of the fifties did not ex-
pressly extinguish governmental authority of the tribes affected,
the loss of a land base left the tribes with no geographic area over
which to exert in rem jurisdiction, and the tribes stopped making
laws and enforcing them in tribal courts. Thus, according to a re-
cent analysis of the status of the terminated tribes, even though
they still possess the legal right to self-government, it is almost
useless in a practical sense."2
Like the terminated tribes, the Seminole Nation lost most of its
land base, and through BIA pressure neglected to exert the
jurisdiction which it still possesses over controversies involving
tribal, members. Also like the terminated tribes, the Seminole Na-
tion ceased to function in its full governmental capacity.
However, unlike the terminated tribes, the Seminole Nation's
right to self-government is still significant legally. As the review of
the elements of termination has shown, the Seminole Nation still
possesses a special status under federal law which gives it access to
opportunities not accessible to terminated tribes. First, the trust
relationship still exists between the United States and the Seminole
Nation. Second, the state does not enjoy complete legislative and
judicial authority over Seminole lands and citizens. Third, the
tribe and its members are still eligible for special federal programs.
240. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 1, at 153.
241. "The tribe has participated in the Office of Economic Opportunity programs of
Headstart and the Neighborhood Youth Corporation. Services provided by other federal
agencies are those of the Farmers Bureau Administration and Agricultural Stabilization
Conservation Service," S. REP No. 1594, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Seminole students
attending federal boarding schools, receive financial assistance from the BIA for college
educations, and are the beneficiaries of Johnson O'Malley funding. Id at 9. Seminole
citizens are also eligible for federal health services, Id. at 8. This type of federal assistance is
not a recent development. General appropriations acts allocating tribal funds for school
purposes include 34 Stat. 325, 342 (1906); 41 Stat. 408, 428 (1920); 44 Stat. 453, 460 (1926);
46 Stat. 1115, 1130 (1931). Appropriations for funds to be used for the education of
Seminoles include the following: 36 Stat. 269, 287 (1910); 39 Stat. 123, § 19 (1916); 43 Stat.
704, 7013 (1924); 46 Stat. 279, 294 (1930); 50 Stat. 564, 583 (1937); 58 Stat. 463, 479 (1944).
242. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 1, at 153-54.
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And finally, the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act provides a
mechanism by which land can be reacquired for the tribe. It is true
that these opportunities are mainly related to the economic sphere
of governmental authority, but economic stability is a crucial first
step in the resumption of other governmental functions such as
jurisdiction. The happenings over the past three-quarters of a cen-
tury have shown that the loss of tribal control over economic and
land interests was disastrous for the Seminole people. Thus, even
if tribal sovereignty has been diminished in the sense of exclusive
jurisdiction over a geographic area, an issue which we do not now
address, the status of the tribal government is still extremely im-
portant in the development of the future of the Seminole people.
The following discussions of the so-called termination of tribal
government and the extent of basic powers necessary for the exer-
cise of government, such as the right to select tribal represen-
tatives and tribal control over funds, is geared to meet this impor-
tant need.
V. Governmental Termination: Harjo v. Kleppe
The termination of tribal government can be the result of two
types of congressional action. One type is an express provision
which terminates or discontinues tribal government. Another type
is a group of provisions which strip tribal government of all
powers essential to self-government, such as the ability to spend
funds, the right to determine form of government, and the power
to determine how their leaders will be selected. Although there
have been no assertions that the former type of governmental ter-
mination occurred as to the Five Tribes, a discussion of those
federal statutes which expressly deal with the continuance of
Seminole tribal existence and government will clarify the analysis
of the latter type of governmental termination.
The Continuance of Seminole Government
Congress first revealed its intention to terminate Seminole
government in the Seminole Agreement, which provided for the
execution of deeds by the chief "when the tribal government shall
cease to exist. 2.. The first statutory provision actually setting a
deadline for termination was the Act of March 3, 1903, which pro-
vided that Seminole government "shall not continue longer than"
March 4, 1906." '* However, Congress was slow to wind up the af-
243. 30 Stat. 567 (1898).
244. 32 Stat. 982, § 8 (1903), repealed34 Stat. 822 (1906) and 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
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fairs of the Five Tribes and two days before the date set by the
1903 act for the end of Seminole government, Congress passed a
joint resolution continuing "the tribal existence and present tribal
governments" of the Five Tribes "in full force and effect for all
purposes under existing laws until all property of such tribes, or
the proceeds thereof shall be distributed among the individual
members of said tribes, unless hereafter otherwise provided by
law.""2 ' In debating the resolution, Congress expressed two major
reasons for the continuance of tribal government. First, it was
feared that if tribal government was discontinued before the
disposal of tribal property, then tribal lands would become part of
the public domain and would then be subject to claims by
railroads." 6 The second reason was concern that termination of
tribal government would place the full burden of maintaining law
and order over 80,000 people on the Secretary of Interior."7 In ad-
dition, it was feared that the tribal schools would cease to func-
tion, and that the absence of a principal chief would interrupt the
allotment process."'
Shortly thereafter, the Five Tribes Act of April 26, 1906, was
enacted." 9 That Act contains the third and final treatment of the
termination question by Congress. Section 28 provides:
That the tribal existence and present tribal government of the
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole
Tribes or nations are hereby continued in full force and effect
for all purposes authorized by law until otherwise provided
by law but the tribal council or legislature in any of said
tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period
than thirty days in any one year: Provided, that no act, or-
dinance, or resolution except resolutions of adjournment of
the tribal council or legislature of any said tribes or nations
shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the
United States: Provided further, that no contract involving
the payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any
property belonging to any of said tribes or nations made by
them or any of them or by any officer thereof, shall be of any
validity until approved by the President of the United
States." °
245. 34 Stat. 822 (1906), amended34 Stat. 137, § 28 (1906).
246. 40 CONG. REC. 3120-22 (1906). This concern arose due to a condition of certain trea-
ty land grants to the tribes that the land would inure to them and their descendants so long
as they existed as a tribe and occupied the land.
247. Id. at 3121.
248. Id. at 3054.
249. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
250. Id.
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The legislative history of this section is consistent with that of the
joint resolution passed the month before.'
In spite of Section 28, federal officials often treated the people of
the Five Tribes as if their governments were terminated. Judicial
interpretations have consistently contradicted that view. In 1911
the Eighth Circuit in United States Express Co. v. Friedman
described the Five Tribes as follows:
Under these laws the Five Tribes and tribal governments still
exist. Eighteen government Indian agents are still maintained
in the Indian Territory exclusive of a large force of
clerks .... At the time of the decision of this case below and
its submission to this court, these tribes of Indians in their
tribal capacity owned about 3,000,000 acres or more of land.
It would indeed be difficult to show how this land ceased to
be Indian country. 2
In 1943 the Supreme Court in Creek Nation v. United States
stated that although at one time Congress planned to terminate
tribal existence, during debate of the 1906 Five Tribes Act it deter-
mined to continue tribal existence and the Act was amended to
that effect. 3
More recently, in 1971 the Tenth Circuit in Groundhog v.
Keeler noted that Cherokee tribal existence was continued by vir-
tue of Section 28 of the Five Tribes Act.24
In spite of these cases, confusion concerning termination of
tribal government continued until 1976, when a district court case,
Harjo v. Kleppe," was decided. This case was an action for
declaratory injunctive relief brought by Creek citizens against the
Department of Interior. In its broadest sense, the central issue was
whether the Creek Tribe still possessed sufficient powers to deal
with tribal affairs as such. The jurisdictional, or, as the Harjo
court termed it, "territorial" sovereignty of the tribe was not at
issue. Plaintiffs claimed that the federal defendants, through their
policies and practices, acted illegally in recognizing the principal
251. One of the main purposes for this provision was to safeguard against any con-
tingency as to certain land grants, 40 CONG. REC. 5046 (1906).
252. 191 F. 673 (8th Cir. 1911).
253. 318 U.S. 629, 638 (1943). In that case it was held that the Seminole Nation could br-
ing a trespass action against railroads using lands reserved from allotment for nonrailroad
purposes, even though the United States was authorized to bring such a suit on behalf of the
tribe.
254. 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971).
255. 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976).
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chief as the sole embodiment of the government in the Creek Na-
tion, and that according to existing federal and Creek law tribal
funds could not be disbursed by the federal defendants for general
tribal purposes without the approval of the Creek council. Defen-
dants argued that the Creek national government had been
rendered incompetent to handle the tribe's financial decision mak-
ing, and that a 1970 law stripping the Interior Department of any
power to appoint the principal chiefs of the Five Tribes impliedly
abolished the entire federal and tribal legal scheme heretofore
defining the form and scope of tribal government. The Harjo
court carefully analyzed the relevant provisions of the Five Tribes
allotment legislation, and concluded that plaintiff Creek citizens
had demonstrated a clear legal entitlement to have their right to
"democratic self-government" vindicated." The court prohibited
the expenditure of tribal funds by the Bureau without the consent
of the Creek council after September 1, 1978, set up a procedure to
be used in the "re-creation" of the Creek constitutional govern-
ment, and prohibited the Department of Interior from approving
any proposed constitution other than one prepared according to
the procedure set out by the court.
In the course of its analysis, the Harjo court addressed the ques-
tion of whether Congress had ever expressly discontinued the
governments of the Five Tribes. The court examined the legislative
intent of Section 28 of the Five Tribes Act and concluded:
The legal effect of this provision was unmistakable: Congress
had declined to terminate the tribal existence or dissolve the
tribal governments, despite the fact that its failure to do so
rendered some of the other provisions of the Five Tribes inef-
fective. While it was anticipated that the tribes would even-
tually be dissolved, the net effect of the act was to expressly
preserve and ratify the then existing authority of the tribal
governments, while reiterating the necessity for Presidential
approval of tribal legislation imposed earlier. That section 28
had the effect of continuing indefinitely the existence of the
Creek tribe has been confirmed by each court that has ex-
amined the question. 7
The Harjo court further analyzed the 1906 resolution and Sec-
tion 28 in light of the frequent Interior interpretations that the sec-
tion merely continued in office the incumbent tribal officers while
abolishing tribal constitutional procedures for filling those posi-
256. Id. at 1143.
257. Id. at 1129.
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tions, thus by implication terminating the government itself when
a sufficient number of officials died or left office. The court noted
that it would not be logical to assume that the 1906 resolution,
which set a specific date for the abolition of tribal government,
also impliedly restructured the government. 8 The court found
that Section 28 of the Five Tribes Act also continued the tribal
form of government because it replaced the termination date with
provisions specifically allowing the continuance of tribal govern-
ments." In further support of this view, the court noted that Sec-
tion 28 continued "present tribal governments," not "incumbents"
or "officials.""z The Harjo court concluded: "For all these reasons,
the Court can only conclude that the intent and effect of Section
28 was to permit the Creek government to continue to operate
under the 1867 constitution as modified by the various statutory
limitations." 6 '
Basic Powers
Even where Congress has not expressly terminated tribal
government, legislation and/or administrative policy depriving
the people of the most basic powers essential to self-government
can effectively prevent tribal government from functioning. Felix
Cohen, the well-known scholar of Indian law, apparently had this
in mind when he stated in his Handbook of Federal Indian Law
that the tribal governments of the Five Tribes were terminated."
Cohen noted that Section 28 continued tribal government, but ap-
parently viewed the Curtis Act and several other provisions of the
Five Tribes Act as being equivalent to termination. Cohen sup-
ported his conclusion with two opinions of Interior officials, brief
descriptions of the Curtis Act and Five Tribes Act, and an assump-
tion that tribal agreements "finally effectuated" the termination of
tribal governments. Cohen made no attempt to consider each of
the provisions he described in light of the whole body of legisla-
tion affecting the Five Tribes in the period of 1893 to 1906, nor did
he cite any evidence of congressional intent concerning that
legislation. A closer analysis of the relevant legislation would have
revealed that the Five Tribes still possess sufficient powers for the
continuance of tribal government, in spite of considerable
diminishment of their territorial sovereignty.
258. Id. at 1130.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 429.
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Unfortunately, such an analysis did not occur until 1976, when
Harjo v. Kleppe was decided. 3 The Harjo court found that the
allotment legislation viewed in its entirety did not terminate the
governments of the Five Tribes, but that the congressional intent
that the governments should continue was circumvented by the
Interior Department:
During the period immediately following the approval of the
Five Tribes Act, the Interior Department behaved as though
it had been successful in its efforts to prevent the enactment
of section 28 and the Congressional changes made in its draft
of section 6. Tha available evidence clearly reveals a pattern
of action on the part of the Department and its Bureau of In-
dian Affairs designed to prevent any tribal resistance to the
Departments' methods of administering those Indian affairs
delegated to it by Congress. This attitude, which can only be
characterized as bureaucratic imperialism, manifested itself
in deliberate attempts to frustrate, debilitate, and generally
prevent from functioning the tribal governments expressly
preserved by section 28 of the Act. ... 264
The Harjo court carefully reviewed the administrative treatment
of the Creeks, which closely paralleled administrative interaction
with the Seminoles." The court's review shows that federal ad-
ministrators attempted to interfere with basic Creek governmental
functions by refusing to permit elections to be held to fill vacancies
of the council; by convincing the chief that he could not call
regular sessions of the council without governmental approval,
and refusing to give such approval; by expending Creek funds
without the knowledge or consent of the Creek council; by exer-
ting influence and control over the various reincarnations of the
Creek national government between 1920 and 1970; by frequently
treating the chief as the sole voice of the Creek Tribe, especially in
the period from 1955 to 1970; and by pursuing a policy of ap-
pointing the chief, thus administering Creek affairs "without even
a token of democracy.""
The Harjo court further noted that the Department often at-
tempted to justify its actions by simply citing federal laws without
further explanation. The court viewed this as evidence of the
"prevalence within the Department of a belief that if the law did
263. 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.C.C. 1976).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1131-39.
266. Id. at 1139.
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not support the outcome sought by the Departments, its objective
was nevertheless best served by refusing to divulge its interpreta-
tion and thereby maximizing the uncertainty with which tribal of-
ficials had to cope."2"7 Although the Department succeeded to a
considerable extent in suppressing tribal authority over tribal af-
fairs for more than half a century, the Harjo court found that this
did not extinguish the Creek Nation's legally enforceable right to
exercise such authority.2"
The Harjo court approached the problem of analyzing the legal
effect of allotment legislation by examining each statute and each
provision in chronological order. While the present discussion will
rely heavily on the Harjo findings, a slightly different approach
will be taken here, involving three questions. The first question
will be whether federal legislation has altered the tribal power to
select tribal leaders free from federal interference. The second
question will concern the effect of federal legislation on the tribe's
ability to determine form of government. The third and final ques-
tion concerns tribal power over financial resources. Like Harjo,
this analysis will be limited to legislation affecting tribal self-
government in the limited sense, .e., tribal organization and
management of tribal economic affairs. However, the analysis
does have broader implications concerning tribal sovereignty:
Without basic control over representation, form of government,
and financial affairs, the possession of other sovereign powers,
such as taxation and judicial authority, would be worthless.
Selection of Tribal Representatives
The ability of the people to select tribal representatives, whether
the method be democratic or otherwise, is basic to self-
government. Prior to the enactment of the Five Tribes Act, federal
administrative officials acknowledged that the Seminole people
possessed this power, and did not interfere with the tribal election
and impeachment process."9 However, the history of post-
267. Id. at 1131, n. 56.
268. Id. at 1139: "As is evident from the foregoing, the influence and control of the
Bureau over the various incarnations of the Creek National government between 1920 and
1970 was exercised wholly without the benefit of any specific congressional mandate. As
such, it constitutes no support whatsoever for the defendant's position in this suit, and in-
deed the history of the period demonstrates the continued vitality and resilience of Creek
political life and institutions, fatally undermining dependent's claim that the Creek political
infrastructure is incapable of discharging the functions plaintiffs assert should be discharg-
ed by a Creek legislative institution."
269. Thus, in 1905 the Interior Department recognized the validity of the impeachment
of the Seminole Chief; "Inasmuch, however, as the Seminole Nation is still recognized as an
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statehood federal involvement with Seminole government has
shown that after statehood the Secretary of Interior refused to
recognize tribal elections and impeachment process. However, the
history of post-statehood federal involvement with Seminole
government has shown that after statehood the Secretary of In-
terior refused to recognize tribal elections, interpreting Section 28
of the Five Tribes Act as continuing the incumbents in office,
rather than continuing the actual form of government. 7° As
already discussed in the analysis of Section 28 herein, this was a
misinterpretation which the Department used to its advantage for
many years.
The history of Bureau treatment of Seminole government has
also shown that because the Five Tribes Act required that all deeds
to tribal lands allotted or sold be signed by the principal chief of
the tribe, federal officials began immediately after its passage to
treat the Seminole chief as the sole representative of the tribe.
Consistent with its policy concerning tribal elections, the Depart-
ment interpreted Section 6 of the Five Tribes Act as authority for
presidential appointment of a chief whenever a deed needed to be
signed. Section 6 provided:
Section 6. That if the principal chief of the Choctaw,
Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, or the governor of the
Chickasaw Tribe, shall refuse or neglect to perform the duties
devolving upon him, he may be removed from office by the
President of the United States, or if any such executive
become[s] permanently disabled, the office may be declared
vacant by the President of the United States, who may fill
any vacancy arising from removal, disability or death of the
incumbent, by appointment of a citizen by blood of the
tribe.... "'
Thus, Seminole chiefs were appointed on several occasions for
brief terms for the limited purpose of signing deeds, in spite of pro-
tests and requests by Seminole citizens for recognition of tribal
elections. 72
autonomous government, that was a matter within their powers, and I agree with the In-
dian Inspector and the Indian Office that the Department should not attempt to interfere
therein," Op. Ass-T ATTY GEN., INTERIOR DEP-T (july 22, 1905); Letter from Ass't Sec. of In-
terior to Indian Inspector (Mar. 24, 1906) (Oklahoma Historical Soc'y Indian Archives,
Seminole Misc. Doc. No. 39518-0), advising that the Department had no jurisdiction over
the election, impeachment, or selection of the Seminole principal chief.
270. Letter from G.W. Woodruff, Acting Secretary of Interior, to F.E. Leupp, Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs (Sept. 5, 1907) (N.A., N.R.D.); Letter from C.J. Rhoades, Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, to Chili Fish (Sept. 28, 1929) (N.A., N.R.D.).
271. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
272. McGeisey, Burk, Fish, and Rhoades Letters, supra note 110.
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A similar misuse of Section 6 with regard to the Creeks was ex-
amined in Harjo v. Kleppe, where it was held that the power of
appointment applied only in three limited circumstances: the
removal, the disability, or the death of the incumbent. '73 The
Harjo court examined the legislative record and found that Sec-
tion 6 as originally drafted continued the chiefs in office in order
to sign deeds and "to represent the tribe in such matters as may be
referred to them by the Secretary of Interior," but that the latter
clause was deleted after Congress, during the course of debate of
the Five Tribes Act, decided to continue tribal government. 7'
Moreover, Harjo found that in enacting Section 6, Congress in-
tended simply to insure that the office whose occupant was charged
by statute with signing the allotment deeds would at all times be
filled, and not to deprive the tribes of the right to continue electing
their principal chiefs, under ordinary circumstances, as long as
their tribal governments continued to exist.27
Although the intent of Section 6 was not judicially established
until the 1976 Harjo decision, Congress made its intentions con-
cerning Seminole tribal representation clear to the Bureau in 1932
by enacting a law which prevented the Secretary from selling,
leasing, encumbering, or in any other manner disposing of tribal
land interests without the approval of the tribe "acting through its
general council selected in pursuance of Seminole customs. 217 Ac-
cording to the committee report of the bill, the Seminole Nation
maintained a strong tribal government, with elected town chiefs,
councilmen, and principal chief. 7 The Commission of Indian Af-
fairs unsuccessfully fought passage of the act, maintaining that no
recognized elections had been held since 1906, and that Section 6
gave the chief alone some authority over the disposition of land. 7'
The history of the administrative treatment of the Seminole
government has shown that soon after passage of the 1932 act the
Bureau took the position that there was no longer a need for a
Seminole chief." Later this policy changed and the Secretary of In-
terior began to recognize the elected chiefs officially by "ap-
pointing" them. Finally, in 1952 Interior officials ceased appoint-
273. 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (D.D.C. Cir. 1976).
274. Id. at 1127, citing40 CONG. REC. 1242 (1906) and H. REP 183, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2(1906).
275. Id.
276. 47 Stat. 140 (1932).
277. H. REP. No. 766, supra note 153, at 2.
278. Id.at3.
279. Letter from C.J. Rhoades, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to John Burgess (July
26,1932) (N.A., N.R.D.).
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ing the Seminole principal chiefs and refused to recognize any
significant authority in them.2" Instead, they attempted to deal
with the council chairman as the authoritative tribal spokesman.
There is even some evidence that the Bureau interfered with the
composition of the elected council by replacing some council
members with hand-picked representatives." '
This uncertain state of affairs continued until 1969, when the
new Seminole constitution was adopted by tribal members and
approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The constitu-
tion provides for the election of three council members from each
band, and a general election of the chief. 2 Tribal members had ap-
parently become so convinced of the authority of the Department
to appoint the chief that a provision was included in the constitu-
tion which provides that pursuant to Section 6 of the Five Tribes
Act the President can appoint a chief to replace the elected chief.2 '
This misinterpretation of Section 6 was corrected the following
year when Congress enacted the Act of October 22, 1970. "' The
Act provides that notwithstanding any other provisions of law,
the principal chiefs and governors of the Five Tribes are to be
"popularly selected" by the respective tribes in accordance with
procedures established by the officially recognized tribal spokes-
man and/or governing entity and subject to approval by the
Secretary of Interior." Although the Act requires secretarial ap-
proval of election procedures, it restored to the people the right to
select their chief. Rather than expressly repealing Section 6 of the
Five Tribes Act, which needed no repeal, Congress "repealed" an
administrative policy which had acquired the force of law with the
passage of time. Thus, today the right of the Seminole people to
select both their chief and council is expressly protected by federal
legislation.
Power to Determine Form of Government
The power to determine form of government is one of the most
basic rights of Indian tribes repeatedly recognized in federal Indian
280. S. REP. No. 1594 upra note 3, at 6.
281. Minutes of the Meeting of a Committee for Reorganization (May 24, 1958)
(Grounds Files).
282. Constitution of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma (adopted Mar. 8, 1969), art. Ill,
§ 3 and art. IV.
283. Id., art. III, § 3.
284. 84 Stat. 1091 (1970).
285. The Act was amended so as to substitute the phrase "popularly selected" for
"elected" because the House Committee felt the choice of the method of selecting principal
officers should be left to the tribe itself, Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1141 (D.D.C.
1976), citing H. REP. No. 91-1499, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG &
ADMIN. NEWS 4332, 4333 (1970).
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law," and is one of the most complex of all the powers incidental
to tribal sovereignty. A discussion of government in the context of
tribal sovereignty necessitates a very sophisticated approach
because legislation which diminishes a sovereign power can result
in some changes in the structure of government, affecting at least
indirectly the power to determine form of government. This type
of approach is, however, outside the scope of this paper, and the
present discussion will be limited to an inquiry into the effect of
the Five Tribes Act, the 1932 Act, and the 1970 election Act on
structure of government, and the effect of the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act on concepts and organization of government.
The stance taken by federal administrators in regard to inter-
pretation of Sections 6 and 28 of the Five Tribes Act..7 and the Act
of April 27, 1932," ' not only interfered with the power to select
tribal leaders, but also with the power to determine form of
government. By interpreting Section 28 as continuing incumbents
in office and not the form of government, and by interpreting Sec-
tion 6 as requiring federal appointment of a chief for the limited
purpose of signing deeds, the Department was able to treat the
chief as a monarch. After the 1932 act was passed, the Department
more or less phased out of its concept of Seminole government the
position of chief and continued to insist that the sole function of
Seminole government, as embodied by the council, was to ap-
prove the disposition of lands.
This type of departmental interference with the Seminole form
of government was completely unsupported by law. The discus-
sion of Section 28 in the context of the continuance of government
has already revealed that Congress did not intend to abolish either
the structure or basic functions of Seminole government. Ac-
cording to the Harjo court, although Congress included provi-
sions in Section 28 limiting the duration of council meetings and
requiring presidential approval of tribal legislation, "it had equal-
ly explicitly recognized and preserved the authority of the national
legislature and the basic form of government established by the
1867 constitution."2" Furthermore, although Section 6 of the Five
286. The nature of tribal systems is such that all internal matters are the responsibility ot
the tribal community, not the federal government, Pueblo of Santa Rose v. Fall, 272 U.S.
315 (1972); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973). This
basic right "should constitute the prevailing policy influencing the Congressional view of
the total federal-Indian relationship," TASK FORCE Two OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMM'N, 94th CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 28 (Comm. Print 1976)
1 hereinafter cited as REPORT ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT].
287. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
288. 47 Stat. 140 (1932).
289. 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1143 (D.D.C. Cir. 1976).
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Tribes Act requires thesignature of the chief on deeds, there is
nothing in the Act which indicates that Congress intended that the
chief be the sole representative of the tribe, or that the sole func-
tion of the chief should be the signing of deeds. As for the 1932
act, Congress could not have made its intent more clear. The sole
purpose of the act was to prevent the Bureau from appointing a
chief and obtaining his signature on the deed to the last of the
Seminole lands, thus forcing the land sale without tribal consent."
The committee report for the 1932 act expressly recognized that
the Seminole government was composed of both a council and a
principal chief,9 ' and there is nothing in either the act or its
legislative history indicating that Congress intended to limit the
function of the government to control over the disposition of land.
The Department's rather calculated manipulation of congres-
sional intent continues even into the 1970's. For example, in Harjo
the Secretary of Interior presented a rather strained interpretation
of the meaning of the Act of October 22, 1970, which provides for
the popular selection of principal chiefs of the Five Tribes."'
The Secretary of Interior argued that the legislative history of
the 1970 act showed that Congress was made aware that the af-
fairs of the Five Civilized Tribes were being administered by prin-
cipal chiefs and a governor,93 and that Congress therefore intend-
ed to abolish the underlying legal authority for a constitutional
government and ratify the "present form of government.""' The
Harjo court failed to find such broad implications in the Act,
whose purpose was simply to permit members of the Five Tribes
to select their own principal chiefs or governor free from federal
interference. The court noted that since the underlying theory of
the Act was to facilitate tribal self-determination to the maximum
extent possible, Congress could not have intended to impliedly
290. 53 CONG. REC. 6596 (1932); "Mr. Stafford: 'As I understand from reading the letter
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs the Commission does not intend to dispose of the
rights anyway'."
"Mr. McKeown: 'For the present. He will not say that he will not do it in the future. The
feeling of the members of the Committee was that as soon as Congress adjourned, he might
proceed to sell the lands'." See H. REP. 766, supra note 153, at 2, wherein it is stated: "The
purpose of the bill H.R. 10362 is to make certain that the Mekasukey land will not be sold
or conveyed away as was the Emohaka land without the consent of the Seminole Tribe, ac-
ting through its general council."
291. H. REP. 766, supra note 153, at 2.
292. 84 Stat. 1091 (1970).
293. The 1932 act recognizing the authority of the Seminole council over the disposition
of tribal lands did not extend to the other tribes, and so the Bureau continued to recognize
the exclusive authority of the chiefs of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Cherokee
tribes over tribal affairs.
294. 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1140 (D.D.C. 1976).
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dismantle "an existing form of government which provided more
self-government than the scheme allegedly to be substituted.
295
The Harjo court found further support for this view in the wor-
ding of the Act to the effect that chiefs will be "popularly selected"
rather than "elected," reflecting congressional concern that the
federal government not force its ideas of proper form of govern-
ment on the tribes.9
Although the Harjo court carefully reviewed the 1906 and 1970
acts in reaching its conclusion that throughout the years Congress
has explicitly recognized the basic form of government established
by the Creek 1867 constitution, it did not discuss the Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act..7 at any length, simply stating that "no conten-
tion is made that the Act had any effect on the status of the Creek
National Government under existing law, nor does the Court find
any such effect." ' 8 However, a brief discussion of the O.I.W.A.
could help to clarify the legal status of Seminole government. The
United States Supreme Court has stated in dictum that the Five
Tribes have been "authorized" under the O.I.W.A. to resume
some of their former powers, implying that the governments of
the Five Tribes possess only those powers expressly granted them
by the Act.' This view is contrary to the clear intent of the Act,
which expressly reaffirms already existing powers of internal
sovereignty, including the power to determine form of govern-
ment, in addition to expressly granting certain other powers.
Section 3 of the O.I.W.A. provides that Oklahoma tribes may
organize and adopt a charter of incorporation under its provision.
The section provides that the charter of incorporation
may convey to the incorporated group, in addition to any
powers which may properly be vested in a body incorporated
under the laws of the State of Oklahoma, the right to par-
ticipate in the revolving credit fund and to enjoy any other
rights or privileges secured to an organized In dian tribe under
the Act ofJune 18, 1934."
The rights or privileges secured to an organized tribe under the
Act of June 18, 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act, are set out in
Section 16 of that Act as follows:
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1141.
297. 25 U.S.C. §§ 501 etseq. (1970).
298. 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1136 n.87 (D.D.C. Cir. 1976).
299. Board of County Comm'nrs v. Sever, 318 U.S. 705, 718 (1943); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 614 n 1 (1943) (dissent). See also Wilkinson &
Biggs, supra note 1, at 144 n.51, which implies that the O.I.W.A. restored some of the
"lost" powers of the "terminated" Five Tribes.
300. 25 U.S.C. § 503 (1970) (emphasis added).
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In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law, the constitution adopted by said
tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the
following rights and powers: To employ legal counsel, the
choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the ap-
proval of the Secretary of Interior; to prevent the sale,
disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in
lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe;
and to negotiate with the Federal, State, and local Govern-
rnents.' °
Shortly after the passage of the I.R.A., an Interior Department
opinion held that tribal powers of internal sovereignty are vested
in the various tribes "under existing law" within the meaning of
the I.R.A. provision, and that the provision reaffirms such vested
powers."2 Case law has been consistent with this interpretation, 3"
and in 1977 an American Indian Policy Review Commission
report reaffirmed this view of the I.R.A. as follows:
Thus Congress not only clearly conceded that existing law
recognizes inherent powers vested in Indian tribes, but also
affirmatively defined certain rights which tribes could exer-
cise pursuant to constitutions adopted under the act.... in
fact, nearly every conceivable governmental power
necessary to maintain tribal existence as an independent
301. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
302. 55 Dep't of Interior 18, 19 (1934). "[Tihe phrase 'powers vested in any Indian Tribe
or tribal council by existing law' does not refer merely to those powers which have been
specifically granted by the express language of treaties or statutes, but refers rather to the
whole body of tribal powers which courts and Congress alike have recognized as properly
wielded by Indian tribes, whether by virtue of specific statutory grants of power or by vir-
tue of the original sovereignty of the tribe insofar as such sovereignty has not been curtailed
by restrictive legislation or surrendered by treaties." Id. at 18.
303. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 499 F.2d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1974), the court expressly stated that the portion of Section 16 pro-
viding for the employment of legal counsel was to recognize certain attributes of Indian
sovereignty, reflecting the Act's overall purpose of restoring a measure of self-control and
initiative to the tribe itself. It has been recognized that the power of taxation is an inherent
sovereign power which may be implemented in a tribal constitution pursuant to Section 16,
Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 J (8th Cir. 1956). In Ortiz-Barraza v. United
States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975), it was held that the inherent sovereign powers to ex-
clude treopassers from the reservation and to create and administer a criminal justice system
over tribal members and within the limits of the reservation can be implemented by a tribal
ordinance coupled with an I.R.A. tribal constitutional provision. Another post-I.R.A.
case, Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.
1974), recognized that the "quasi-sovereign status of Indian tribes entitled them to deter-
mine the extent to which the franchise to vote is to be exercised in tribal elections without
26th amendment of Indian Civil Rights Act restrictions, absent explicit congressional
legislation to the contrary.
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political entity had already been recognized by existing law
prior to enactment of the I.R.A. The only limitation on the
powers of Indian tribes under existing law was, and still is, an
express limitation by the Congress."
Since the O.I.W.A. incorporated by reference the section of the
I.R.A. protecting all powers vested in any tribe, it must be similar-
ly interpreted as preserving all sovereign powers not expressly
taken by Congress. There is nothing in the legislative history of
the O.I.W.A. requiring a contrary interpretation.05
In spite of this protection of sovereign powers, at first glance it
appears that the I.R.A. and O.I.W.A. have interfered with the
power to determine form of government by providing for the
adoption of tribal constitutions and corporate charters under
federal supervision. However, the more logical interpretation is
that these two statutes are merely vehicles for tribal economic
organization. According to a report to the American Indian Policy
Review Commission "[I1ndeed, among the powers recognized by
existing law on the part of Indian tribes was the power to create
and define the nature of tribal government. That is, prior to the
I.R.A. tribes were already recognized as having the power to
adopt constitutions and by-laws if they should so choose."" The
report further indicates that because the I.R.A. reaffirmed those
powers already possessed by tribes, including the power to define
government, it did not limit tribes to organization under the
I.R.A."7 As this rationale also holds true for the O.I.W.A., it
follows that Oklahoma tribes are not required to organize under
the O.I.W.A. Apparently the Harjo court took this view when it
stated that "the [Creek] tribe as a whole is legally entitled to
develop a new constitution to be adopted either as an exercise of
the tribe's inherent sovereignty or pursuant to the provisions of
304. REPORTON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 286, at 18.
305. For the legislative history of the O.I.W.A., see 80 CONG. REC. 5557, 6652, 8572,
9448-450, 9884-845, 10107, 10278, 10359, 10552 (1936). For a general discussion and com-
parison of the I.R.A. and O.I.W.A., see AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, MANUAL
OF INDIAN LAW, at n.1 (1976).
306. REPORT ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 286, at 18. See also AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94th CONG., 2d SESS., FINAL REPORT 188 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
307. REPORT ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 286, at 18-19. According to the Report:
"In our analysis, it seems clear that the I.R.A., other than in its provisions which halted the
allotment policy, is of limited significance .... The results of this research reinforced our
feeling that there is little practical significance to sections 16 and 17 of the I.R.A.," Id.
However, the Report noted that the choice presented to the tribes regarding acceptance or
rejection of the I.R.A. placed an unfair burden on them"inasmuch as they were asked to
choose between coming under the total provisions of the I.R.A. without an adequate op-
portunity to totally understand the implications, or to totally reject the act." Id. at 22.
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the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act."" Carried one step farther,
this reasoning also results in the conclusion that organizing tribes
are not limited to a constitutional form of government patterned
after the United States Constitution. Indeed, until fairly recently,
the Seminole form of government was embodied in a group of
written laws rather than in a constitution, and consisted of only
two branches of government authorized to carry out the ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial functions of the tribe.
The foregoing consideration of the effect of the O.I.W.A. on the
ability of the Seminole Tribe to organize free from federal control
and concepts as one aspect of the power to determine form of
government highlights one peculiar facet of the Harjo decision
which should be mentioned. Although all the findings in Harjo
emphasized the right of the Creeks to determine their form of
government, the court fashioned a'legal remedy inconsistent with
this right." '° According to the court, there was no national
legislature as contemplated by the 1867 constitution in existence
and thus the constitutional Creek government had to be recreated
before the Bureau could legally expend tribal funds with the ap-
proval of the Creek council as required by the 1867 Creek con-
stitution. The court stated that the re-creation of the constitutional
Creek government should be accomplished by the Creeks
themselves, but then proceeded to specify the exact procedure to
be used, instead of leaving it up to the tribal towns to elect town
308. 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1144 (D.D.C. 1976).
309. This is at least true for those tribes who organize by virtue of their inherent
sovereignty, rather than under the I.R.A. or O.I.W.A. The I.R.A. has been criticized by
the American Indian Policy Review Commission because it requires that constitutions and
by-laws adopted by tribes pursuant to the Act be ratified and approved by the Secretary,
FINAL REPORT supra note 306, at 188. The Commission also recommended that the I.R.A.
be amended "to reflect specifically the fact that tribes have an inherent right to form their
own political organizations in the form which they desire." Id. at 192. However, both
statutory and case law involving the effect of the Federal Constitution on tribal government
does not have to embrace federal values and concepts. Prior to the enactment of the Indian
Civil Rights Act in 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 etseq. (1970), federal courts refused to extend
constitutional restrictions over Indian tribal activities, because to do so would violate the
inherent sovereignty of tribal government. See Constitutional Rights of the American
Tribal Indian, 51 VA. L. REV. 121, 141 (1965). The Indian Civil Rights Act enumerates
specific rights which are not to be abridged by tribal government, id., § 1302. While the
enumerated rights in the I.C.R.A. are similar to those found in amendments one, four, five,
six, seven, and eight of the United States Bill of Rights, some courts have found standards
different from traditional Anglo standards more appropriate to the tribal setting. See Tom
v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir.
1974); Lohnes v. Cloud, 336 F. Supp. 620, 633 (D.N.D. 1973); Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux
Tribes, 3130 F. Supp. 438 (D.S. 1974). For a general discussion of the effect of the I.C.R.A.
on tribal sovereignty, seeNote, Indian Bill ofRights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal
Governments, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1343 (1969).
310. 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1143-47 (D.D.C. 1976).
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chiefs and councilmen pursuant to the 1867 constitution. In spite
of the fact that the 1867 constitution authorized only the council
to make constitutional amendments or submit a new constitution
for amendment, the court ordered a referendum on a proposed
new constitution which had already been drafted by a committee
appointed by the chief. It further determined the voting re-
quirements, created a five-member commission to handle the
referendum and make any necessary changes in the draft, and re-
quired that it be forwarded to the Bureau for approval. The Creek
plaintiffs have appealed this remedy because it subjects the Creek
Nation to considerable judicial and executive involvement in the
most basic aspect of the right to determine form of govern-
ment-the very organization of the government. The remedy is a
further example of the misguided legal conclusions and interpreta-
tions the Five Tribes have experienced in exercising their right to
self-government.
Power to Allocate and Spend Tribal Funds
The power to expend funds is essential to self-government for
the obvious reason that governmental decisions are powerless
without control of financial resources. In addition, the power to
expend funds has taken on special significance because of the
Secretary's attempts to hamper the functioning of the govern-
ments of the Five Tribes by withholding tribal funds desired by
them for council meetings, salaries, and other basic expenses.
Several provisions, most of which are contained in the allot-
ment legislation, deal with the expenditure of the funds of the Five
Tribes. The first such provision is Section 19 of the Curtis Act,
which provides:
That no payment of any moneys on any account whatever
shall hereafter be made by the United States to any of the
tribal governments or to any officers thereof for disburse-
ment, but payments of all sums to members of said tribes
shall be made under direction of the Secretary of the Interior
by an officer appointed to him; and per capita payments shall
be made direct to each individual in lawful money of the
United States, and the same shall not be liable to the payment
of any previously contracted obligation."'
As already discussed, the Curtis Act probably was never intended
to apply to the Seminole Nation. This was recognized to some ex-
311. 30 Stat. 495 (1898).
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tent by the Supreme Court in Seminole Nation v. United States,
where the Court assumed, "without deciding," that Section 19 ap-
plied to the Seminole Nation, and proceeded to give it a narrow
interpretation."2 The Court held that it prohibited payments by
the federal government to the tribal treasurer only when such
payments were to be distributed to tribal members. The Act had
no application to money earmarked for educational or tribal pur-
poses, or for any other purpose the tribe might designate.' In
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that if the
first clause of Section 19 was construed as prohibiting all
payments to the Seminole Nation, then the later clauses, which
provided only for payments to members and per capita payments,
would be inadequate to cover the disbursement of money for the
expenses of maintaining and conducting tribal government,
"despite the fact that the Seminole tribal government was not only
to continue after the Curtis Act but was in fact relieved of the
necessity of securing Presidential approval of its legislation by an
agreement ratified three days after the passage of that statute.""'
The Court also noted that as originally introduced, Section 19
provided that payments of "all expenses incurred in transacting
their business" were to be made under the direction of the
Secretary of Interior. The Court reasoned that the deletion of that
proviso from the final clause shows that Congress intended that
tribal officers should retain the right to disburse their funds for
government expenses.' Section 19 was similarly interpreted in
Choctaw Nation v. United States,"' a Court of Claims case, and in
Harjo V. Kleppe.3 1 7
The Seminole Agreement, ratified three days after the Curtis
Act, authorized the Department's control over some tribal
funds." ' The Agreement set aside $50,000 of Seminole funds held
by the United States as a permanent school fund, and directed that
the interest from the fund be used by the Secretary of Interior for
the support of Seminole schools "after extinguishment of tribal
government. 1''3 Section 10 of the Five Tribes Act 2' also authorized
the Secretary of Interior to run the tribal schools of the Five Tribes
312. 316 U.S. 286, 301 (1942).
313. Id. at 302-303.
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with tribal funds. This section interfered substantially with tribal
control over educational needs of tribal members. In 1930 the last
of the Seminole schools was discontinued by the Department of
Interior in spite of protests of Seminole citizens and in spite of the
fact that there was more than $100,000 in the Seminole school
fund."' Ironically, the Seminole Nation was the only one of the
Five Tribes having funds available for school purposes, and was
the only one of those tribes for which the government ceased
maintaining schools at that time.32 If the tribe had had control of
its educational fund, this situation would not have occurred.
The Five Tribes Act also contained four other sections which
dealt with tribal financial affairs. A provision in Section 28 re-
quired that the President of the United States approve all contracts
made by the tribes involving the expenditure of money. Section 11
provided for the collection of "all revenues of whatever character"
accruing to the tribes before or after dissolution, by an officer ap-
pointed by the Secretary of Interior. It further authorized the of-
fice to pay all lawful claims against the tribe resulting from con-
tracts or regularly issued warrants. It also abolished tribal taxes
after December 31, 1905, and required tribal officers or members
in possession of tribal property to turn it over to the Secretary
upon dissolution of the tribal government. According to the Harjo
court, the legislative history of the Five Tribes Act indicates that
the first provision of Section 11 was intended only to provide a
mechanism for the collection of revenues accruing after the con-
templated dissolution, and thus did not affect a tribe's authority to
manage financial affairs as long as the tribes were in existence.
However, the second provision abolishing tribal taxes affected the
ability of the tribes to acquire revenue.
The other two provisions of the Five Tribes Act affecting tribal
financial affairs in the event of the dissolution of tribal govern-
ment were Sections 24 and 17. Section 24 provided that any ex-
penses incident to the establishment of public highways in the ter-
ritory of any tribe be paid from tribal funds by the Secretary. Sec-
tion 17 directed the Secretary to pay any remaining tribal funds
per capita to tribal members when any tribe's financial affairs had
been concluded by the sale of any unallotted land or other proper-
ty and the payment of any outstanding obligations. According to
the Harjo opinion, Section 17 presumed a prior dissolution of the
tribe because tribal financial affairs could not be concluded until
321. H. REP. No. 766, supra note 153, at 2.
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the tribe ceased to exist and function as such."' The court further
noted that because the provision applied only to tribal assets in-
volved in the allotment process, any assets accruing to the tribe at
a later time were not covered by the section."
Thus, the Seminole Nation's general control over tribal funds
survived the allotment legislation, with limitations only on the
tribe's power to tax, to distribute funds to its members, and to
control the school fund. However, the Department of Interior
cited the allotment legislation as authority to prevent the Five
Tribes from controlling and using tribal funds for any purposes,
and abused this control by mishandling the funds of some of the
tribes." Congress became concerned with the situation, and each
appropriation bill from 1912 until 1922 restricted the Secretary's
authority to make disbursements from the funds except for the
following purposes: equalization of allotments, payments to in-
dividual members, education, employment of attorneys, and the
salaries and contingent expenses of chiefs, secretaries, interpreters,
and mining trustees. Congress made this restriction on the
Secretary permanent in the Act of May 24, 1922."27 According to
the Court of Claims in Creek Nation v. United States, this legisla-
tion did not limit the use of tribal funds for expenses of the tribal
governments, including those of council meetings. 2'
The authority of the Seminole Nation over its funds has been
expressly recognized in the two more recent statutes. The Act of
July 3, 1952, authorized the Five Tribes to make contracts "involv-
ing the payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any
property belonging to the Five Tribes" with the approval of the
Secretary of Interior, under such rules and regulations as he might
prescribe. 2' The Act of October 17, 1968, provided that the judg-
ment funds from two Seminole Indian Claims Commission cases
and the Seminole school fund, plus the interest on those funds,
"may be advanced, expended, invested, or reinvested for any pur-
pose that is authorized by the General Council of the Seminole
Tribe of Oklahoma or other recognized governing body of that
tribe and approved by the Secretary of Interior." ''3 The congres-
324. Id.
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326. Id, at 1134, citing Creek Nation v. United States,78 Ct. CI. 474 (1933).
327. 25 U.S.C. § 124 (1970).
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sional authorization of the tribal use of the judgment funds was
necessary because "the annual appropriation acts for the Depart-
ment of Interior prohibit the use of any Indian Claims judgment
until after legislation has been enacted that sets forth the purposes
for which the money may be used."33' The authorization of tribal
use of the school fund was necessary due to the provision in the
Seminole Agreement placing that fund within the control of the
Secretary of Interior.
Conclusion: The Legal Status of the Five Tribes-
Question for the Future
Although the present analysis has been confined to a discussion
of the legal status of the Seminole government, it provides
answers to some questions concerning the status of the Five Tribes
in general, insofar as it has involved the interpretation of legisla-
tion affecting the tribes as a group. First, it is clear that these tribes
still enjoy a special trust relationship with the federal government
and have not been terminated as the Klamath and other tribes
were terminated during the 1950's. Second, Congress expressly
continued the existence of the governments of the Five Tribes and
intended that tribal members continue to operate them. Finally,
the Five Tribes still possess basic powers necessary to the exercise
of their right to self-government, i.e., the powers to select tribal
representatives, determine form of government, and disburse
funds. The few limitations Congress has placed on basic govern-
mental operations of the Five Tribes as a group consist of the re-
quirement that the Secretary of Interior approve election pro-
cedures;"2 the requirement that the President approve all tribal
resolutions and ordinances;... the limitation on length of council
meetings;... the authorization of the Secretary of Interior to have
access to the books and records of the Five Tribes;.3 . the require-
ment that the Secretary, rather than the tribe, expend any per
capita payments;3 and the authorization of the Secretary to make
rules and regulations and approve contracts made by the tribes in-
volving the expenditure of funds. 7 Thus, federal administrators
331. S. REP No. 1594, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
332. 84 Stat. 1091 (1970).
333. 34 Stat. 137, § 28 (1906).
334. Id.
335. 25 U.S.C. § 199 (1970).
336. 30 Stat. 495, § 19 (1898). See36 Stat. 1070, § 17 (1911), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 156
(1970), which gives the Secretary of Interior the authority to designate the depositories for
the receipts from the sale of surplus and unallotted lands of the Five Tribes and to make per
capita payments from the interest on those funds.
337. 82 Stat. 1148 (1968).
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have far less control over tribal affairs than they have been willing
to admit for the last three -quarters of a century.
However, several important and difficult questions remain to be
answered for each tribe individually. First, the special legislation
affecting each tribe, apart from the others, needs to be examined
in order to determine whether Congress has placed any limita-
tions, other than the ones enumerated herein, on their basic
governmental powers. Second, the impact of the old tribal con-
stitutions and laws on the present tribal governments need further
study. While the Harjo case held that the old Creek constitution
was still valid, the court obviously had problems in understanding
the actual utilization of that document. Even where the old con-
stitutions have been replaced by new ones, as in the case of the
Seminole and Cherokee nations, questions remain concerning the
validity of the old laws and their relationship with the new con-
stitutions.338 Finally, the tribes still face the difficult task of deter-
mining the extent of inherent sovereignty still vested in them, such
as powers of taxation, judicial authority, and legislative authority
over land use. This will entail a study of the legislative intent
behind the allotment legislation and the separate allotment
agreements, and should determine whether a federal legislative
remedy is necessary to the resumption of the exercise of any given
sovereign power.
Admittedly, these remaining legal questions are somewhat in-
timidating, but the Creek people have set a precedent in solving
difficult questions in their successful litigation of the Harjo case.
The importance of the Harjo case has already been recognized by
Choctaw and Chickasaw citizens. At a congressional hearing in
May, 1977, they raised objections to the proposed sale of the
338. The new Seminole constitution contains no reference to the 1903 Revised Statutes
of the Seminole Nation. Thus, it is possible that those provisions of the 1903 Revised
Statutes not inconsistent with the new constitution are still valid today. As for the
Cherokees, their new constitution, The Constitution of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma
(effective July 5, 1976), specifically supersedes the provisions of the 1839 tribal constitution
in Article XVI. Interestingly, a case brought by some Cherokee citizens against the newly
elected chief, the former chief, the election committee, and the BIA, was decided a few
months prior to the adoption of the new Cherokee constitution, and contains dictum to the
effect that the 1839 Cherokee constitution was a "dead letter." That case, Drywater v.
Keeler, No. 75-247-C, Slip op. (D.Okla. Mar. 31, 1976), was brought pursuant to the In-
dian Civ I Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970), and alleged that elections for chief
were not conducted pursuant to the 1839 constitution. The action was dismissed, however,
because the court found that the named defendants were only tribal members, and not ac-
tually the tribe per se, so that no jurisdiction could be had under the provisions of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act. While the dictum in the Drywater case is not persuasive as to the
validity of the old constitution the tribe probably has settled that question by inserting the
provision of supercession in the new. However, no mention is made in the new constitution
of the old Cherokee laws, raising questions concerning the validity of those laws.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/3
Arkansas riverbed, because the Choctaw chief and the Chickasaw
governor were attempting to sell it without council approval as re-
quired by their nineteenth-century tribal constitutions.3 " In
August, Choctaw citizens filed a lawsuit alleging the current
validity of their 1869 constitution."' This type of action is
necessary to the eventual understanding of the Five Tribes allot-
ment legislation. Once this understanding occurs, federal officials
will no longer be able to hide under a cloak of ignorance of the
law, or make their own laws to fit agency goals, and the Five
Tribes can move forward confident of their right to self-
government.
339. Arkansas Riverbed Rights of Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Indian Nations,
Hearings on S. 660, Before the U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 50-53 (1977) (Statement of Jimmy Sam): "Our major concern is that neither the
Bureau nor the principal chief has recognized the integral role that the legislative branch
must have in authorizing the pursuit of such legislation and in considering the ap-
propriateness of the proposed settlements .... I am speaking of the internal institutional
structures of the tribe itself .... Within the Choctaw Nation, our [1860 1 constitution
establishes a role for a general council. But through years of suppression by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and in cooperation with that policy by the principal chiefs since statehood in
1906, they have tended to identify tribal interests with the principal chief and have
recognized him as the sole embodiment of the tribal interests."
340. Morris v. Andrus, No. 77-1667 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 27, 1977). This suit was brought
by Choctaw citizens, members of the Choctaw General Council, against Department of the
Interior officials and the principal chief of the tribe. The complaint alleges that the 1860
tribal constitution is the valid organizational document of the tribe, and that the attempts
of the BIA to treat the Choctaw chief as the sole tribal representative, particularly where
financial matters are concerned, violate the tribal constitution, treaties guaranteeing the
tribe the right to self-government, and the trust relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the tribe. The plaintiffs request the following: a declaratory judgment confirming
the validity and continued force of law of the Choctaw constitution; the issuance of a
preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from disposing of tribal assets and from ex-
pending Choctaw funds, except those for operating expenses; the issuance of injunctive
relief concerning the reorganization of the Choctaw government in accordance with the
Choctaw constitution; and a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from expending
Choctaw funds and disposing of tribal assets, including the tribe's interest in the Arkansas
riverbed, without the approval of the Choctaw General Council.
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